Unpaid Platform Complementors and the Network Effect Mirage

Boudreau, K and Jeppesen, L (2015) Unpaid Platform Complementors and the Network Effect Mirage. Strategic Management Journal, 36 (12). pp. 1761-1777. ISSN 0143-2095

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Official URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/smj.232...


Platforms have evolved beyond just being organized as multi-sided markets with complementors selling to users. Complementors are often unpaid, working outside of a price system and driven by heterogeneous sources of motivation — which should affect how they respond to platform growth. Does reliance on network effects and strategies to attract large numbers of complementors remain advisable in such contexts? We test hypotheses related to these issues using data from 85 online multi-player game platforms with unpaid complementors. We find that complementor development responds to platform growth even without sales incentives, but that attracting complementors has a net zero effect on on-going development and fails to stimulate network effects. We discuss conditions under which a strategy of using unpaid crowd complementors remains advantageous.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Subject Areas: Strategy and Entrepreneurship
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2324
Date Deposited: 02 Mar 2016 18:51
Last Modified: 07 Dec 2016 11:37
URI: http://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/176

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