Get rid of unanimity rule: the superiority of majority rules with veto power

Bouton, L, Llorente-Saguer, A and Malherbe, F (2018) Get rid of unanimity rule: the superiority of majority rules with veto power. Journal of Political Economy, 126 (1). pp. 107-149. ISSN 0022-3808 OPEN ACCESS

Abstract

We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that all unanimous decision rules are not equivalent. We show that majority rules with veto power are (i) Pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules, and (ii) ex-ante efficient in a broad class of situations.

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Item Type: Article
Subject Areas: Economics
Additional Information: © 2018 University of Chicago Press
Subjects: D > Decision-making
Date Deposited: 30 Jun 2016 15:54
Last Modified: 19 Sep 2019 17:30
URI: http://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/198
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