Get rid of unanimity rule: the superiority of majority rules with veto power

Bouton, L and Llorente-Saguer, A and Malherbe, F (2016) Get rid of unanimity rule: the superiority of majority rules with veto power. Journal of Political Economy. ISSN 0022-3808

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Abstract

We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that all unanimous decision rules are not equivalent. We show that majority rules with veto power are (i) Pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules, and (ii) ex-ante efficient in a broad class of situations.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2016 University of Chicago Press
Subjects: D > Decision-making
Subject Areas: Economics
Date Deposited: 30 Jun 2016 15:54
Last Modified: 17 Jun 2017 00:01
URI: http://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/198

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