Unanimous rules in the laboratory

Bouton, L and Llorente-Saguer, A and Malherbe, F (2016) Unanimous rules in the laboratory. Games and Economic Behavior, 102. pp. 179-198. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior. Finally, we exploit a framing effect to study how the presence of less sophisticated agents affects Veto's welfare properties.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2016 Elsevier B V
Subjects: V > Voting
I > Information
Subject Areas: Economics
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.001
Date Deposited: 10 Jan 2017 11:56
Last Modified: 10 Jan 2017 11:59
URI: http://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/775

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