Sourcing from suppliers with financial constraints and performance risk

Yang, S A and Tang, C S and Wu, J (2017) Sourcing from suppliers with financial constraints and performance risk. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management (MOSM). (In Press)

[img] Text
financing_supplier_r2_20161028.pdf - Accepted Version
Restricted to Repository staff only

Download (658kB)

Abstract

Two innovative financing schemes have emerged in recent years to enable suppliers to obtain financing for production. The first, purchase order financing (POF), allows financial institutions to offer loans to suppliers by considering the value of purchase orders issued by reputable buyers. Under the second, which we call buyer direct financing (BDF), manufacturers issue both sourcing contracts and loans directly to suppliers. Both schemes are closely related to the supplier's performance risk (whether the supplier can deliver the order successfully), which the repayment of these loans hinges upon. To understand the relative efficiency of the two emerging schemes, we analyze a game-theoretical model that captures the interactions between three parties (a manufacturer, a financially constrained supplier who can exert unobservable effort to improve delivery reliability, and a bank). We find that when the manufacturer and the bank have symmetric information, POF and BDF yield the same payoffs for all parties irrespective of the manufacturer's control advantage under BDF. The manufacturer, however, has more fexibility under BDF in selecting contract terms. In addition, even when the manufacturer has superior information about the supplier's operational capability, the manufacturer can efficiently signal her private information via the sourcing contract if the supplier's asset level is not too low. As such, POF remains an attractive financing option. However, if the supplier is severely financially constrained, the manufacturer's information advantage makes BDF the preferred financing scheme when contracting with an efficient supplier. In particular, the relative benefit of BDF (over POF) is more pronounced when the supply market contains a larger proportion of inefficient suppliers, when differences in efficiency between suppliers are greater, or when the manufacturer's alternative sourcing option is more expensive.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2017 INFORMS
Subjects: O > Operations management
F > Finance
S > Supply and demand
Subject Areas: Management Science and Operations
Date Deposited: 24 Jan 2017 14:48
Last Modified: 24 Jan 2017 14:48
URI: http://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/777

Actions (login required)

Edit Item Edit Item