Signaling emotion and reason in cooperation

Levine, E E, Barasch, A, Rand, D, Berman, J Z and Small, D A (2018) Signaling emotion and reason in cooperation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147 (5). pp. 702-719. ISSN 0096-3445 OPEN ACCESS

Abstract

We explore the signal value of emotion and reason in human cooperation. Across four experiments utilizing dyadic prisoner dilemma games, we establish three central results. First, individuals infer prosocial feelings and motivations from signals of emotion. As a result, individuals believe that a reliance on emotion signals that one will cooperate more so than a reliance on reason. Second, these beliefs are generally accurate—those who act based on emotion are more likely to cooperate than those who act based on reason. Third, individuals’ behavioral responses towards signals of emotion and reason depends on their own decision mode: those who rely on emotion tend to conditionally cooperate (that is, cooperate only when they believe that their partner has cooperated), whereas those who rely on reason tend to defect regardless of their partner’s signal. These findings shed light on how different decision processes, and lay theories about decision processes, facilitate and impede cooperation.

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Item Type: Article
Subject Areas: Marketing
Additional Information: © 2018 American Psychological Association. This is the peer-reviewed manuscript version of: Levine, E E, Barasch, A, Rand, D, Berman, J Z, & Small, D A (2018). Signaling Emotion and Reason in Cooperation, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(5), 702-719 - available at http://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/xge0000399 This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record.
Subjects: E > Emotions
T > Thinking
Date Deposited: 05 Feb 2018 15:39
Last Modified: 18 Jan 2019 11:39
URI: http://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/928
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