Edmans, A, Goncalves-Pinto, L, Groen-Xu, M and Wang, Y (2018) Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months. Review of Financial Studies, 31 (11). pp. 4099-4141. ISSN 0893-9454
Abstract
We find that CEOs release 20% more discretionary news items in months in which they are expected to sell equity, predicted using scheduled vesting months. These vesting months are determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by the current information environment. The increase arises for positive news, but not neutral or negative news, nor non-discretionary news. News releases fall in the month before and month after the vesting month. News in vesting months generates a temporary increase in stock prices and market liquidity, which the CEO exploits by cashing out shortly afterwards.
More Details
Item Type: | Article |
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Subject Areas: | Finance |
Additional Information: |
© 2018 Society for Financial Studies. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Review of Financial Studies following peer review. The version of record, Alex Edmans, Luis Goncalves-Pinto, Moqi Groen-Xu, Yanbo Wang; Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 31, Issue 11, 1 November 2018, Pages 4099–4141, is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy070 |
Funder Name: | European Research Council |
Date Deposited: | 05 Jun 2018 09:38 |
Date of first compliant deposit: | 05 Jun 2018 |
Subjects: |
Financial markets News |
Last Modified: | 08 Oct 2024 02:07 |
URI: | https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/972 |