**Online Appendix to**

# INSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF MINORITY EMPLOYEES AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: EVIDENCE FROM THE LGBT EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION ACTS

Table A1. Year of Employment Antidiscrimination Law Enactment, 1977 to 2011

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| State/District | Year |
| District of Columbia | 1977 |
| Wisconsin | 1982 |
| Massachusetts | 1989 |
| Californiaa | 1991 |
| Connecticut | 1991 |
| Hawaii | 1991 |
| Vermont | 1991 |
| New Jersey | 1992 |
| Minnesota | 1993 |
| Rhode Island | 1995 |
| New Hampshire | 1998 |
| Nevada | 1999 |
| Maryland | 2001 |
| New Mexico | 2003 |
| New York | 2003 |
| Maine | 2005 |
| Illinois | 2006 |
| Washington | 2006 |
| Colorado | 2007 |
| Iowa | 2007 |
| Delaware | 2009 |

Source: Gao and Zhang (2017); Hunt (2012); Cohen, O’Byrne and Maxwell (1999).  
aCalifornia enacted ENDA legislation in 1992; however, this was preceded in 1991 by a court decision (*Soroka vs. Dayton Hudson*) that interpreted labor code provisions as prohibiting all employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their sexual orientation (Cohen et al., 1999).

Table A2. Correlations

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| (1) Entrepreneurial foundings | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (2) Startup quality (patents) | 0.306 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (3) Startup quality (VC) | 0.228 | 0.506 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (4) Startup quality (survival) | -0.147 | 0.265 | 0.086 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (5) Antidiscrimination | 0.081 | 0.490 | 0.343 | 0.151 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (6) GDP per capita | 0.111 | 0.341 | 0.307 | -0.066 | 0.335 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (7) Job creation rate | 0.006 | -0.086 | 0.002 | -0.165 | -0.080 | 0.006 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |  |
| (8) Proportion black | 0.170 | -0.204 | -0.034 | -0.134 | -0.165 | -0.113 | -0.021 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |
| (9) Proportion women | 0.188 | 0.130 | 0.134 | 0.125 | 0.009 | -0.209 | -0.128 | 0.528 | 1.000 |  |  |  |
| (10) Proportion college | 0.178 | 0.540 | 0.454 | 0.102 | 0.481 | 0.706 | -0.072 | -0.133 | 0.115 | 1.000 |  |  |
| (11) Red governor | 0.075 | 0.199 | 0.066 | 0.080 | 0.126 | 0.031 | -0.030 | -0.075 | 0.073 | 0.115 | 1.000 |  |
| (12) Taxation level | -0.187 | -0.035 | -0.029 | 0.108 | 0.222 | 0.061 | -0.017 | -0.152 | -0.153 | 0.073 | -0.052 | 1.000 |
|  | | | | | | | | | | | | |

**Table A3. Determinants of Employment Antidiscrimination law enactment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | Antidiscrimination  enactment | Antidiscrimination  enactment | Antidiscrimination  enactment | Antidiscrimination  enactment | Antidiscrimination  enactment |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Entrepreneurial foundings | 0.000 |  |  |  | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) |  |  |  | (0.000) |
| Startup Quality (Patents) |  | -0.817 |  |  | 2.605 |
|  |  | (3.125) |  |  | (2.872) |
| Startup Quality (VC) |  |  | 0.257 |  | 0.186 |
|  |  |  | (0.227) |  | (0.244) |
| Startup Quality (Survival) |  |  |  | -0.298 | -0.281 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.132) | (0.153) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,459 | 1,459 | 1,459 | 1,459 | 1,459 |
| State FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-squared | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.048 | 0.050 | 0.050 |

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. OLS models. All independent variables are one-year lagged.

**Table A4. Test of the Difference in the Effect of Employment Antidiscrimination Laws across States**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Test of the difference | (1)  High vs. low  gay population states | (2)  High vs. low  civil rights litigation states |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Entrepreneurial foundings | p=0.011 | p=0.073 |  |
| Startup Quality (Patents) | p=0.002 | p=0.011 |
| Startup Quality (VC) | p=0.067 | p=0.061 |  |
| Startup Quality (Survival) | p=0.000 | p=0.203 |

**Table A5. Effect of Employment Antidiscrimination Laws on Self-Employment According to Occupations**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | Entry in high-LGTB  occupations | Entry in low-LGBT occupations |
|  |  |  |
| Antidiscrimination | -0.0002 | 0.0006 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.001) |
| GDP per capita | -0.0048 | -0.0241 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.070) |
| Proportion black | -0.0020 | -0.0396 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.025) |
| Proportion women | 0.0015 | 0.0664 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.048) |
| Proportion college | -0.0016 | 0.1313 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.024) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,326 | 1,326 |
| R-squared | 0.074 | 0.470 |
| Number of statefips | 51 | 51 |
| State FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes |

Note: OLS, robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. CPS data are available from 1995 to 2019.

Table A6. Effect of Employment Antidiscrimination Laws on the Share of Startups Founded by Minorities

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Share all minorities | Share female minority | Share other minorities |
|  |  |  |  |
| Antidiscrimination | -0.013 | -0.020 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.011) | (0.002) |
| GDP per capita | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Job creation rate | 0.000 | 0.003 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) |
| Proportion black | -0.054 | -0.478 | -0.065 |
|  | (0.195) | (0.243) | (0.041) |
| Proportion women | 0.896 | 3.173 | 0.308 |
|  | (0.332) | (0.838) | (0.085) |
| Proportion college | -0.261 | 0.460 | -0.050 |
|  | (0.202) | (0.193) | (0.027) |
| Red governor | 0.002 | 0.016 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.006) | (0.001) |
| Taxation level | -0.002 | 0.007 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.001) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 996 | 996 | 996 |
| R-squared | 0.820 | 0.160 | 0.203 |
| State FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Note: OLS, robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. NETS data on new firms founded by minorities are available from 1989 to 2011.

Table A7. Effect of Employment Antidiscrimination Laws on Firm Antidiscrimination Programs

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Gay-lesbian antidiscrimination policies | Diversity programs | CSR score |
|  |  |  |  |
| Antidiscrimination | 0.099 | 0.147 | 0.262 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.048) | (0.104) |
| Size (employees) | -0.000 | 0.001 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Capital expenditure | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Leverage | 0.044 | 0.216 | 0.322 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.096) | (0.154) |
| Cash holdings | -0.000 | 0.133 | 0.259 |
|  | (0.041) | (0.130) | (0.221) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 12,865 | 14,386 | 14,386 |
| R-squared | 0.663 | 0.789 | 0.835 |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| State FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Note: OLS, robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. KLD data are available from 1991 to 2012 (from 1995 to 2012 for gay-lesbian antidiscrimination policies).

Table A8. Effect of Firm Antidiscrimination Programs on Entrepreneurial Foundings and Startup Quality

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | (Log of) Entrepreneurial foundings | Startup Quality  (Patent) | Startup Quality  (VC) | Startup Quality  (Survival) | (Log of) Entrepreneurial foundings  IV | Startup Quality (Patents)  IV | Startup Quality (VC)  IV | Startup Quality (Survival)  IV |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gay-lesbian antidiscrimination policies | -0.206 | 0.003 | 0.133 | 0.005 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.087) | (0.002) | (0.053) | (0.009) |  |  |  |  |
| Gay-lesbian antidiscrimination policies (instrumented) |  | 0.000 |  |  | -0.875 | 0.029 | 0.336 | 0.060 |
|  |  | (0.000) |  |  | (0.271) | (0.007) | (0.100) | (0.040) |
| GDP per capita | 0.000 | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Job creation rate | 0.007 | 0.021 | 0.000 | -0.000 | 0.009 | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.010) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Proportion black people | -0.716 | -0.006 | 0.076 | 0.239 | 0.640 | -0.010 | -0.156 | 0.175 |
|  | (0.825) | (0.030) | (0.239) | (0.106) | (0.424) | (0.010) | (0.131) | (0.085) |
| Proportion women | 3.739 | 0.020 | 1.192 | 0.075 | 4.393 | -0.066 | 0.730 | -0.052 |
|  | (2.549) | (0.015) | (0.819) | (0.408) | (1.348) | (0.031) | (0.539) | (0.241) |
| Proportion college | -1.064 | 0.000 | 0.788 | -0.316 | 0.231 | -0.033 | 0.379 | -0.428 |
|  | (1.233) | (0.000) | (0.414) | (0.175) | (0.800) | (0.018) | (0.251) | (0.119) |
| Red governor | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | -0.001 | 0.009 | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.014) | (0.000) | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.007) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.001) |
| Taxation level | -0.056 | 0.003 | -0.001 | 0.004 | -0.057 | -0.000 | -0.002 | 0.004 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.008) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Observations | 1,350 | 1,350 | 1,350 | 1,350 | 1,350 | 1,350 | 1,350 | 1,350 |
| State FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-squared |  | 0.541 | 0.387 | 0.521 | 0.317 | 0.016 | 0.302 | 0.507 |
| Log-likelihood | -53814.627 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. OLS models in columns 1-4; IV models in columns 5-8. KLD data on “gay-lesbian antidiscrimination policies” are available from 1995 onwards. For dates before 1995 (as well as for any state-year observation for which we do not have information), we substitute missing values with zero.

**Table A9. Experimental vignette study**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Control Group | | Treatment Group |
| **Baseline scenario info**  *Imagine that you are currently working as an employee at some company.*  *Given this information, how likely would you be to leave your current employer to start your own business?* | **Baseline scenario info**  **+**  **neutral info (same length as treatment info)**  *The state in which you live has recently adopted a Sugary Drink Law.  This means that the amount of sugar in carbonated drinks is limited.*  *Given this information, how likely would you be to leave your current employer to start your own business?* | **Baseline company info**  **+**  **Antidiscrimination Laws Info**  *The state in which you live has recently adopted an Employment Anti-Discrimination Law*  *This means that employers are banned from discriminating against employees based on gender, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation*  *Given this information, how likely would you be to leave your current employer to start your own business?* |

**Table A10: Experimental evidence: Randomization Check**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Panel (E): Full Sample** | |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Control | Control | Treated |  |
|  |  | Baseline | Length-matched | Anti-discrimination  Law |  |
|  |  | (*N* = 183) | (*N* = 116) | (*N* = 125) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (1) | (2) | (3) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Respondent’s Age (1-6)** | 2.51 | 2.57 | 2.69 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Difference (*p*-value in parentheses) |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (1) | -1.129 | (0.259) |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (2) | 0.205 | (0.837) |  |  |
|  | (1) vs. (2) | -1.309 | (0.191) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Respondent’s Education (1-5)** | 2.66 | 2.58 | 2.69 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Difference (*p*-value in parentheses) |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (1) | -0.257 | (0.797) |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (2) | -0.863 | ( 0.388) |  |  |
|  | (1) vs. (2) | 0.736 | (0.462) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Respondent’s Income (1-12)** | 5.36 | 5.41 | 5.30 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Difference (*p*-value in parentheses) |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (1) | 0.172 | (0.863) |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (2) | 0.272 | (0.785) |  |  |
|  | (1) vs. (2) | -0.134 | (0.893) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Respondent’s Work Experience (1-4)** | 2.21 | 2.49 | 2.47 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Difference (*p*-value in parentheses) |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (1) | -2.130 | (0.034) |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (2) | 0.138 | (0.889) |  |  |
|  | (1) vs. (2) | -2.162 | (0.031) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Respondent is Female (0-1)** | 0.48 | 0.58 | .55 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Difference (*p*-value in parentheses) |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (1) | 0.533 | (0.594) |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (2) | 0.530 | (0.594) |  |  |
|  | (1) vs. (2) | -1.641 | (0.101) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Respondent is White (0-1)** | 0.663 | 0.724 | 0.704 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Difference (*p*-value in parentheses) |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (1) | -0.755 | (0.450) |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (2) | 0.344 | (0.731) |  |  |
|  | (1) vs. (2) | -1.109 | (0.268) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Respondent is from Northeast (0-1)** | 0.119 | 0.137 | 0.144 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Difference (*p*-value in parentheses) |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (1) | -0.626 | (0.531) |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (2) | -0.134 | (0.893) |  |  |
|  | (1) vs. (2) | -0.464 | (0.642) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Respondent is from Midwest (0-1)** | 0.108 | 0.060 | 0.144 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Difference (*p*-value in parentheses) |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (1) | -0.925 | (0.355) |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (2) | -2.139 | (0.033) |  |  |
|  | (1) vs. (2) | 1.425 | (0.155) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Respondent is from South (0-1)** | 0.304 | 0.267 | 0.296 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Difference (*p*-value in parentheses) |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (1) | -0.358 | (0.720) |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (2) | -0.493 | (0.621) |  |  |
|  | (1) vs. (2) | 0.187 | (0.851) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Respondent is from West (0-1)** | 0.304 | 0.267 | 0.296 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Difference (*p*-value in parentheses) |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (1) | 0.766 | (0.443) |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (2) | 1.080 | (0.281) |  |  |
|  | (1) vs. (2) | -0.421 | (0.673) |  |  |

**Table A11: Experimental evidence**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Panel (A): Full Sample** | |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Control | Control | Treated |  |
|  |  | Baseline | Length-matched | Anti-discrimination  Law |  |
|  |  | (*N* = 183) | (*N* = 116) | (*N* = 125) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (1) | (2) | (3) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Willingness to start a business** | 2.62 | 2.57 | 2.18 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Difference (*p*-value in parentheses) |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (1) | 0.441 | (0.011) |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (2) | 0.401 | (0.037) |  |  |
|  | (1) vs. (2) | 0.039 | (0.826) |  |  |
| **Panel (B): Full Sample** | |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Control | Control | Treated |  |
|  |  | Baseline | Length-matched | Anti-discrimination  Law |  |
|  |  | (*N* = 183) | (*N* = 116) | (*N* = 125) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (1) | (2) | (3) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Enjoy working for the employer** | 3.38 | 3.49 | 3.88 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Difference (*p*-value in parentheses) |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (1) | -0.504 | (0.000) |  |  |
|  | (3) vs. (2) | -0.395 | (0.003) |  |  |
|  | (1) vs. (2) | -0.108 | (0.362) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table A12. Effect of Employment Antidiscrimination Laws According to Exemption for Small Firms

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Entrepreneurial foundings  +/- 10 yrs | Startup Quality (Patents)  +/- 10 yrs | Startup Quality (VC)  +/- 10 yrs | Startup Quality (Survival)  +/- 10 yrs |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Antidiscrimination (all firms) | -0.034 | 0.001 | -0.006 | 0.014 |
|  | (0.043) | (0.001) | (0.009) | (0.007) |
| Antidiscrimination (exempt small firms) | -0.066 | 0.003 | 0.049 | 0.013 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.001) | (0.022) | (0.009) |
| GDP per capita | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Job creation rate | 0.006 | -0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Proportion black people | -0.718 | 0.015 | 0.142 | -0.072 |
|  | (0.763) | (0.009) | (0.234) | (0.139) |
| Proportion women | 3.897 | -0.008 | 1.437 | 0.303 |
|  | (2.581) | (0.029) | (0.928) | (0.359) |
| Proportion college | -1.014 | 0.008 | 0.846 | -0.633 |
|  | (1.317) | (0.013) | (0.387) | (0.196) |
| Red governor | 0.003 | 0.000 | -0.003 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.000) | (0.004) | (0.002) |
| Taxation level | -0.049 | -0.000 | -0.002 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,350 | 1,350 | 1,350 | 1,350 |
| R-squared |  | 0.583 | 0.385 | 0.632 |
| State FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| State trend | No | No | No | Yes |
| Log-likelihood | -53310.947 |  |  |  |

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Poisson model in Model 1; Log-linear OLS model in Models 2, 3 and 4.

**Table A13: Effect of Employment Antidiscrimination Laws on firm exit (1980-2006)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Firm exit | Firm exit  +/- 10 yrs | Firm exit  +/-5 yrs |
|  |  |  |  |
| Antidiscrimination | -0.009 | -0.012 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.026) | (0.025) |
| GDP per capita | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Job creation rate | -0.016 | -0.016 | -0.016 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Proportion black | -1.416 | -1.687 | -1.241 |
|  | (0.749) | (0.675) | (0.731) |
| Proportion women | 0.542 | -2.845 | -3.394 |
|  | (2.297) | (2.333) | (2.586) |
| Proportion college | 0.380 | 1.587 | 2.494 |
|  | (1.173) | (1.049) | (1.120) |
| Red governor | -0.009 | -0.003 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.009) | (0.009) |
| Taxation level | -0.031 | -0.036 | -0.043 |
|  | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.015) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,350 | 1,124 | 981 |
| State FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Log-likelihood | -59907.230 | -49968.068 | -45921.300 |

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Poisson models.

**Table A14. Effect of Employment Antidiscrimination Laws** **Controlling for GDP Growth Rate**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Entrepreneurial foundings  +/- 10 yrs | Startup Quality (Patents)  +/- 10 yrs | Startup Quality (VC)  +/- 10 yrs | Startup Quality (Survival)  +/- 10 yrs |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Antidiscrimination | -0.056 | 0.002 | 0.025 | 0.014 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.001) | (0.014) | (0.006) |
| GDP per capita | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| GDP growth rate | 0.475 | -0.001 | 0.001 | 0.130 |
|  | (0.233) | (0.001) | (0.034) | (0.022) |
| Job creation rate | 0.004 | -0.000 | 0.001 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Proportion black | -0.679 | 0.014 | 0.110 | -0.018 |
|  | (0.783) | (0.010) | (0.254) | (0.144) |
| Proportion women | 3.471 | -0.012 | 1.344 | 0.173 |
|  | (2.705) | (0.025) | (0.870) | (0.357) |
| Proportion college | -0.651 | 0.009 | 0.867 | -0.673 |
|  | (1.337) | (0.013) | (0.403) | (0.200) |
| Red governor | 0.002 | 0.000 | -0.001 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.000) | (0.005) | (0.002) |
| Taxation level | -0.045 | -0.000 | -0.002 | 0.002 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.000) | (0.003) | (0.002) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,350 | 1,350 | 1,350 | 1,350 |
| State FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| State trend | No | No | No | Yes |
| R-squared |  | 0.570 | 0.364 | 0.644 |
| Log-likelihood | -52890.835 |  |  |  |

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Poisson model in Model 1; Log-linear OLS model in Models 2, 3 and 4.

**Table A15. Effect of Employment Antidiscrimination Laws Controlling for Other Simultaneous shock (1990-2006)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Entrepreneurial foundings  +/- 10 yrs | Startup Quality (Patents)  +/- 10 yrs | Startup Quality (VC)  +/- 10 yrs | Startup Quality (Survival)  +/- 10 yrs |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Antidiscrimination | -0.061 | 0.002 | 0.024 | 0.014 |
|  | (0.027) | (0.001) | (0.013) | (0.006) |
| GDP per capita | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Job creation rate | 0.006 | -0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Proportion black | -0.244 | 0.015 | 0.135 | -0.057 |
|  | (0.804) | (0.011) | (0.261) | (0.148) |
| Proportion women | 3.551 | -0.011 | 1.386 | 0.325 |
|  | (2.518) | (0.026) | (0.875) | (0.358) |
| Proportion college | -0.665 | 0.008 | 0.850 | -0.639 |
|  | (1.265) | (0.013) | (0.386) | (0.193) |
| Red governor | 0.002 | 0.000 | -0.001 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.000) | (0.005) | (0.002) |
| Taxation level | -0.048 | -0.000 | -0.002 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.001) |
| Judicial reforms | 0.076 | 0.000 | 0.006 | 0.008 |
|  | (0.034) | (0.001) | (0.006) | (0.009) |
| Trade Secret Protection | 0.046 | -0.000 | -0.015 | 0.005 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.000) | (0.008) | (0.007) |
| Inter-state Banking Deregulation | 0.040 | -0.000 | -0.009 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.000) | (0.005) | (0.004) |
| Intra-state Banking Deregulation | -0.028 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.031) | (0.000) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,350 | 1,350 | 1,350 | 1,350 |
| State FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| State trend | No | No | No | Yes |
| R-squared |  | 0.572 | 0.368 | 0.633 |
| Log-likelihood | -51820.451 |  |  |  |

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Poisson model in Model 1; Log-linear OLS model in Models 2, 3 and 4.