Profit Sharing and Incentives

Ozdenoren, E and Rubanov, Oleg (2022) Profit Sharing and Incentives. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 83. p. 102857. ISSN 0167-7187 OPEN ACCESS

Abstract

We model a firm as a team production process subject to moral hazard and derive the optimal profit sharing scheme between productive workers and outside investors together with incentive contracts based on noisy performance signals. More productive agents with noisier performance signals are more likely to receive shares which can explain why managers are motivated by shares, and law or consulting firms form partnerships. A firm that grows by opening branches is held almost entirely by outside investors when its output noise grows faster than the number of branches. Otherwise, insiders hold substantial amount of a large firm’s shares.

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Item Type: Article
Subject Areas: Economics
Date Deposited: 30 May 2022 11:27
Date of first compliant deposit: 30 May 2022
Last Modified: 10 Jul 2022 00:24
URI: https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/2539
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