Dynamic Asset-Backed Security Design

Ozdenoren, E, Yuan, K and Zhang, S (2023) Dynamic Asset-Backed Security Design. Review of Economic Studies. ISSN 0034-6527 (In Press)


Borrowers obtain liquidity by issuing securities backed by the current period payoff and resale price of a long-lived collateral asset, and they are privately informed about the payoff distribution. Asset price can be self-fulfilling: a higher asset price lowers adverse selection and allows borrowers to raise greater funding, which makes the asset more valuable, leading to multiple equilibria. Optimal security design eliminates multiple equilibria, improves welfare, and can be implemented as a repo contract. Persistent adverse selection lowers debt funding, generates volatility in asset prices and exacerbates credit crunches. The theory demonstrates the role of asset-backed securities on stability of market-based financial systems.

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Item Type: Article
Subject Areas: Economics
Date Deposited: 04 Apr 2023 15:18
Date of first compliant deposit: 04 Apr 2023
Last Modified: 05 Apr 2023 14:15
URI: https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/2803

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