Harbord, D and Ottaviani, M (2001) Contracts and competition in the pay-TV market. Working Paper. London Business School Regulation Initiative Working Paper Series.
Abstract
This paper analyses how contractual arrangements for the sale and resale pf premium programming affect competition in payTV market. Competition is less effective when resale contracts specify persubscriber fees rather than lumpsum payments. When premium programming is sold at terms similar to those observed in the UK, consumers can be made worse off than in the absence of premium programming. A number of potential remedies are considered. A ban on exclusive vertical contracts would intensify downstrream competition and transfer benefits of premium programming to consumers.
More Details
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Subject Areas: | Economics |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Sep 2023 15:12 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Sep 2023 13:59 |
| URI: | https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/3259 |
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