Volpin, P and Cocco, J F (2013) Corporate pension plans as takeover deterrents. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48 (4). pp. 1119-1144. ISSN 0022-1090
Abstract
We use UK data to show that firms that sponsor a defined-benefit pension plan are less likely to be targeted in an acquisition and, conditional on an attempted takeover, they are less likely to be acquired. Our explanation is that the uncertainty in the value of pension liabilities is a source of risk for acquirers of the firm's shares, which works as a takeover deterrent. In support of this explanation we find that these same firms are more likely to use cash when acquiring other firms, and that the announcement of a cash acquisition is associated with positive announcement effects.
More Details
Item Type: | Article |
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Subject Areas: | Finance |
Date Deposited: | 17 May 2016 11:55 |
Last Modified: | 06 Nov 2024 02:59 |
URI: | https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/371 |