Unanimous rules in the laboratory

Bouton, L, Llorente-Saguer, A and Malherbe, F (2016) Unanimous rules in the laboratory. Games and Economic Behavior, 102. pp. 179-198. ISSN 0899-8256 OPEN ACCESS


We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior. Finally, we exploit a framing effect to study how the presence of less sophisticated agents affects Veto's welfare properties.

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Item Type: Article
Subject Areas: Economics
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© 2016 Elsevier.This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

Date Deposited: 10 Jan 2017 11:56
Date of first compliant deposit: 05 Jan 2017
Subjects: Voting
Last Modified: 13 Dec 2022 01:46
URI: https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/775

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