

LBS Research Online

D Efron, H M Markus, L M Jackman, Y Muramoto and H Muluk

Hypocrisy and culture: failing to practice what you preach receives harsher interpersonal reactions in independent (vs. interdependent) cultures

Article

This version is available in the LBS Research Online repository: <https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/950/>

Efron, D, Markus, H M, Jackman, L M, Muramoto, Y and Muluk, H

(2018)

Hypocrisy and culture: failing to practice what you preach receives harsher interpersonal reactions in independent (vs. interdependent) cultures.

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 76. pp. 371-384. ISSN 0022-1031

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.12.009>

Elsevier

Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LBS Research Online for purposes of research and/or private study. Further distribution of the material, or use for any commercial gain, is not permitted.

Running head: CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY

Hypocrisy and Culture:
Failing to Practice What You Preach Receives
Harsher Interpersonal Reactions in Independent (vs. Interdependent) Cultures

Daniel A. Effron^{*a}

Hazel Rose Markus^b

Lauren M. Jackman^b

Yukiko Muramoto^c

Hamdi Muluk^d

*Corresponding author.

^a Organisational Behaviour Subject Area, London Business School, Regent's Park,
London, NW1 4SA, United Kingdom. +44 (0)20 7000 8922. Email: deffron@london.edu

^b Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Jordan Hall, Building 420, 450 Serra
Mall, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.

^c Department of Social Psychology, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku,
Tokyo 113-0033, Japan.

^d Faculty of Psychology, University of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia.

Author Note

This research was supported by a grant from the Leadership Institute at London Business School to Daniel A. Effron, and by NSF grant 08440858 to Hazel Rose Markus. We thank Dan Cable, Hemant Kakkar, Benoît Monin, Madan Pillutla, and Xi Zou for helpful feedback.

Abstract

Failing to practice what you preach is often condemned as hypocrisy in the West. Three experiments and a field survey document less negative interpersonal reactions to misalignment between practicing and preaching in cultures encouraging individuals' interdependence (Asian and Latin American) than in those encouraging independence (North American and Western Europe). In Studies 1–3, target people received greater moral condemnation for a misdeed when it contradicted the values they preached than when it did not – but this effect was smaller among participants from Indonesia, India, and Japan than among participants from the USA. In Study 4, employees from 46 nations rated their managers. Overall, the more that employees perceived a manager's words and deeds as chronically misaligned, the less they trusted him or her – but the more employees' national culture emphasized interdependence, the weaker this effect became. We posit that these cultural differences in reactions to failures to practice what one preaches arise because people are more likely to view the preaching as other-oriented and generous (vs. selfish and hypocritical) in cultural contexts that encourage interdependence. Study 2 provided meditational evidence of this possibility. We discuss implications for managing intercultural conflict, and for theories about consistency, hypocrisy, and moral judgment.

Keywords: hypocrisy; social judgment; morality; culture; behavioral integrity; inconsistency

Hypocrisy and Culture:

Failing to Practice What You Preach Receives

Harsher Interpersonal Reactions in Independent (vs. Interdependent) Cultures

Practicing what you preach is not always easy. For example, leaders may struggle to enact policies that fit their stated ideals, and employees may feel obligated to pay lip service at work to values that do not guide their behavior at home. In Western cultural contexts, failing to practice what you preach can have grave interpersonal consequences. The present research examines the possibility that outside the West, misaligned practicing and preaching seems more appropriate and has less severe consequences. Specifically, we predict that people react less negatively to such misalignment in cultures encouraging individuals' *independence* (e.g., North America and Western Europe) compared to cultures encouraging individuals' *interdependence* (e.g., Asian and Latin America).

In Western contexts, “failing to practice what you preach” is often judged as hypocrisy (Stone & Fernandez, 2008), so it is no surprise it elicits negative reactions. For example, it can be seen as hypocritical to “say one thing but do another” (Barden, Rucker, & Petty, 2005), or to excuse yourself while condemning others for the same misdeed (Lammers, 2012; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010; Polman & Ruttan, 2012; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007, 2008). Research in the West has focused on two negative interpersonal consequences of misaligned practicing and preaching. The first is moral condemnation. Vignette experiments show that the same misdeed seems more hypocritical and thus receives greater moral condemnation when it contradicts values the transgressor has previously endorsed than when it does not (Barden, et al., 2005; Barden, Rucker, Petty, & Rios, 2014; Effron, Lucas, & O'Connor, 2015; Jordan, Sommers, Bloom, & Rand, 2017; Laurent, Clark, Walker, & Wiseman, 2013; Powell & Smith, 2012). For

example, an academic might seem less moral and more deserving of punishment for committing plagiarism if she had previously given a speech about the importance of academic integrity than if she had not. The second interpersonal consequence is distrust. Field studies show that when employees perceive managers as chronically “saying one thing but doing another,” they distrust the managers, which dampens the employees’ motivation, organizational commitment, and performance (for a review, see Simons, Leroy, Collewaert, & Masschelein, 2014).

Although this previous research often equates hypocrisy with inconsistency, the two are actually distinct constructs (Monin & Merritt, 2012). We distinguish between failures to practice what you preach – termed *word-deed misalignment* (Simons, 2002) – and hypocrisy, which we view as a morally discrediting attribution for such misalignment (cf. Cha & Edmondson, 2006). Specifically, we argue misalignment seems hypocritical only if it appears motivated by a self-serving desire seem more virtuous than you really are (cf. Batson, Thompson, Seufferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999). When people attribute word-deed misalignment to a different motive, they view it as less hypocritical and condemn it less severely (Barden, et al., 2005; Barden, et al., 2014). For example, when a person advises others to “do as I say, not as I’ve done,” observers tend not to listen because they view her advice as hypocritical – unless she has suffered for what she has done. In that case, they interpret her advice as a genuine attempt to help them and are more inclined to listen (Effron & Miller, 2015). More generally, the same act of misalignment can seem more hypocritical or more benign, depending on the situations in which it occurs. We propose that culture, like situations, powerfully shape how people understand word-deed misalignment. Such misalignment may not seem as hypocritical – and thus not elicit the same degree of negative interpersonal reactions – in all cultural contexts.

Some theoretical perspectives imply that word-deed misalignment will have negative interpersonal consequences in all cultures. A person who preaches without practicing a value can be seen as sending a “false signal” about his or her morality (Jordan, et al., 2017). A tendency to respond to such false signals with moral condemnation and distrust should help people in all societies avoid exploitation by individuals who merely appear benevolent. Also, evolutionary pressures may have created a fundamental human aversion to false moral signals, because early humans’ survival depended in part on their ability to avoid exploitation (Kurzban, 2010). Finally, violating a value that one expects others to follow could seem unfair, which would violate moral codes across cultures (Graham et al., 2011).

However, we propose that aversion to word-deed misalignment arises in some important part from culturally grounded assumptions about the nature of the self and the drivers of human behavior. These assumptions are reflected in *models of self* – elements of culture revealed and fostered in individuals’ psychological tendencies, in everyday social interactions and norms, in institutional policies, and in pervasive cultural ideas and values (Markus, 2016; Markus & Kitayama, 2003; Stephens, Fryberg, Markus, Johnson, & Covarrubias, 2012). These models guide people’s behavior and shape how they understand and explain others’ actions.

According to the *independent* model, the self has a true essence, is defined by internal attributes, and is separate from social contexts (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Lillard, 1998; Markus & Conner, 2014; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Riemer, Shavitt, Koo, & Markus, 2014; Triandis, 1995). This model assumes a person’s core identity remains constant across time and situations, even if he or she does not always behave the same way. The *interdependent* model, by contrast, defines the self by social roles, relationships, norms, and contexts (Fiske, et al., 1998; Lillard, 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Riemer, et al., 2014;

Triandis, 1995). Because each person occupies multiple social roles, acts in different contexts, and owes attention, concern and loyalty to multiple individuals and groups, an interdependent self must be flexible and fluid across time and situations. Although all cultures require and foster both independence and interdependence, the independent model is more prominent and normatively sanctioned in the West (i.e., North America and Western Europe), whereas the interdependent model is more prominent and sanctioned in the non-Western cultures that characterize most of the world (Arnett, 2008; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Markus & Conner, 2014).

We propose that the independent model fosters more negative reactions than the interdependent model to people who fail to practice what they preach because each model suggests a different interpretation of the preaching. A negative interpretation is that their preaching has the selfish aim of creating the false appearance of virtue (i.e., hypocrisy). For example, an employee might publicly promote safety regulations despite privately ignoring them because she wants to earn a promotion, seem superior to her coworkers, or deflect attention from her shortcomings. A more positive explanation ascribes the preaching to generous, other-oriented intentions. For example, the employee may not personally care about safety, but promote it anyway because she wants to help her colleagues avoid punishment for violations, to bolster her organization's reputation, or to help her boss implement a safety initiative. According to such explanations, word-deed misalignment reflects a willingness to put others before the self rather than implying hypocrisy.

The negative explanation for preaching, with its emphasis on selfishness and hypocrisy, resonates with the independent model of self. To believe a person's preaching reflects feigned virtue requires drawing a distinction between how virtuous people "truly" are and how virtuous

their public behavior is. This distinction is ingrained in the independent model's view that the self has a true essence separate from social contexts. The multiple faces a person chooses to show to the world are like masks, concealing the true self. The distinction between apparent and actual virtue makes less sense in the interdependent model, in which social contexts are defining elements of self. According to this model, virtue does not only come from within, but is bestowed by other people based on public behavior. The multiple faces a person must show to the world do not mask but constitute the self. For example, Japanese distinguish between the public or "front self" (*omote*) and the private or "back self" (*ura*). Importantly, both selves are authentic, and knowing when to restrain the "back" in deference to the "front" self is a valued skill. When the two conflict, Japanese are expected to favor the *omote* (Doi, 1986; Lebra, 2004; Riemer, et al., 2014).

The positive explanation for preaching, with its emphasis on other-oriented intentions, resonates better with the interdependent model. Interdependence requires fulfilling relational obligations, preserving harmony, and being socially sensitive (Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004; Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002; Riemer, et al., 2014). To meet these requirements, people must modify their words and deeds depending on whom they are with – which will sometimes require preaching without practicing. Observers in interdependent contexts are thus likely to assume that actors' preaching arises, at least in part, from other-oriented intentions. For example, in Asian cultures, "publicly agreeing, while privately disagreeing, with others may be seen as exemplifying tact and sensitivity rather than submission and cowardice" or hypocrisy (Hodges & Geyer, 2006, p. 7).

To summarize, people could have either selfish or generous reasons for preaching a value despite not practicing it. Observers in all cultures are capable of entertaining both types of

reasons when seeking to explain an actor's behavior. However, we expect the selfish reasons to be more plausible and salient to actors in cultures that encourage independence. Given cultural differences in how people interpret word-deed misalignment, we expect cultural differences in how negatively people react to it. Specifically, we formulated the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis: Word-deed misalignment will provoke greater moral condemnation and distrust in cultures that emphasize independence relative to those that emphasize interdependence.

To our knowledge, we are the first to test this prediction. In so doing, we build on previous work documenting cultural differences in how people think about inconsistency. People in Asia are less likely than people in the West to expect themselves and others to act consistently across situations (Choi & Nisbett, 2000; English & Chen, 2007). Among people who hold a more interdependent model of self, cross-situational inconsistency is less predictive of well-being (Church et al., 2014; Cross, Gore, & Morris, 2003; Suh, 2002). In Asian versus Western cultures, making choices that appear inconsistent with personal preferences is more common (Savani, Markus, & Conner, 2008), and does not arouse as much cognitive dissonance (Heine & Lehman, 1997; Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005; Kitayama, et al., 2004). Finally, the dialectical mode of reasoning associated with interdependence embraces contradiction and paradox, unlike the analytical mode of reasoning associated with independence (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999).

We go beyond this prior work on culture and inconsistency in several ways. The type of inconsistency we examine – between words and deeds – has not been considered in previous cultural research, which has instead focused on inconsistencies between preferences and choices (e.g., Hoshino-Browne, et al., 2005), among logical propositions (Peng & Nisbett, 1999), or among actions across situations (e.g., Choi & Nisbett, 2000). Perhaps because of this focus,

previous research, unlike the present work, has not delved into on the negative interpersonal consequences of inconsistency, and how they might differ by culture. Instead, prior work has focused on *intrapersonal* consequences like cognitive dissonance and wellbeing.

Our work also contributes to research on how culture shapes the explanations people provide for others' behavior. Previous research suggests that people are more likely to attribute behavior to dispositions, instead of situations, in Western than in Asian cultures (e.g., Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994). We move beyond this disposition/situation dichotomy, which has been criticized for failing to capture how laypeople actually explain behavior (Malle, 1999, 2011; see also Stephens, Hamedani, Markus, Bergsieker, & Eloul, 2009), in four ways. First, we examine whether culture affects negative interpersonal reactions (i.e., moral condemnation and distrust), which research on culture and attribution has neglected. Second, we propose that culture affects whether people attribute preaching to selfish or generous motives, which is orthogonal to the disposition/situation distinction. Helpful or selfish motives for preaching could be mapped onto dispositions or situations (e.g., "she is a helpful/selfish person" vs. "her work environment causes her to act helpfully/selfishly"). Third, it is difficult to derive our hypothesis from the possibility that people in independent cultural contexts are more likely to attribute preaching to dispositions, because not all dispositional attributions would provoke condemnation and undermine trust. For example, someone who preaches environmentalism but does not always recycle could be the kind of person who truly values the environment despite not always acting "green," or who merely pretends to value the environment to signal virtue. Both possibilities are dispositional attributions for preaching, but only the second suggests hypocrisy and would likely provoke negative reactions. Fourth, whereas previous research examines how culture can affect judgments of a person's deeds, we examine

how culture affects reactions to the *degree of misalignment* between a person's deeds and words (above and beyond any cultural differences in reactions to the deeds themselves). For example, previous research would predict that Americans are more likely than Japanese to attribute reckless driving to the driver's disposition, which could conceivably lead Americans to condemn the driver more harshly than Japanese. Independent of whether this cultural difference emerged, though, we would predict that Americans would increase their condemnation more than Japanese upon learning that the driver used to preach the importance of road safety. In other words, whereas past research on dispositional attributions predicts only a main effect of culture on social judgment, we are interested in the interactive effect of culture and misalignment.

Our investigation builds theory in several other areas as well. First, we suggest that theories of hypocrisy judgments (e.g., Barden, et al., 2005; Effron, et al., 2015; Jordan, et al., 2017; Simons, 2002) are based on Western assumptions about the nature of the self that do not fully generalize to global contexts. Thus, such misalignment may not have as negative interpersonal consequences everywhere in the world. Second, by investigating where word-deed inconsistency will seem most problematic, we shed light on what counts as hypocrisy and why it bothers people – a question about which current theories offer little consensus (e.g., Alicke, Gordon, & Rose, 2013; Graham, Meindl, Koleva, Iyer, & Johnson, 2015; Hale & Pillow, 2015; Monin & Merritt, 2012). If failing to practice what you preach only counts as hypocrisy when attributed to an attempt to feign virtue, as we claim, then it should receive less negative reactions in cultures where this attribution is likely less salient. Third, we extend research in cultural psychology by testing our hypothesis – a novel prediction based on models of self (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 2010).

The Present Research

We describe four studies testing whether people react more negatively to word-deed misalignment in cultures emphasizing independence than in those emphasizing interdependence. Following previous research in the social psychology literature on judgments of misalignment (e.g., Effron & Monin, 2010), the negative reaction examined in Studies 1–3 was moral condemnation. These vignette experiments tested whether people would receive harsher moral condemnation for the same misdeed if they previously preached against it than if they did not, and whether this effect would be larger in a Western country (the US) than in three diverse Asian countries (Japan, India, or Indonesia). Study 2 also examined cultural differences in how people explained the misalignment as a potential mechanism. Importantly, the design of these studies isolates reactions to misalignment from reactions to misdeeds, thus ruling out the alternative explanation that some cultures simply react more negatively to misdeeds than others.

Study 4 was a field survey examining culture differences in negative reactions to managers' word-deed misalignment in the workplace. Following previous research in the organizational behavior literature on misalignment (e.g., Kannan-Narasimhan & Lawrence, 2012; Palanski, Kahai, & Yammarino, 2011; Simons, Friedman, Liu, & McLean Parks, 2007), the negative reaction examined was distrust. We expected that the more misaligned employees perceive a manager's words and deeds and being, the less they trust him or her, as in previous research (for a review, see Simons, et al., 2014). Going beyond previous research, we tested whether this relationship between misalignment and trust would be stronger in cultures fostering independence than in those fostering interdependence. To increase generalizability beyond the East-West comparison in Studies 1-3, Study 4 recruited participants from 46 nations, which allowed us to test whether participants' reactions to misalignment depended on their home

country's degree of interdependence. Study 4 also sought to isolate the role of independence/interdependence from other cultural variables.

We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions for all studies (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). Verbatim materials are posted at <https://osf.io/xy4c6/>. The Online Supplement's Appendix S3 also reports two additional studies, described in the General Discussion, that attest to Study 4's robustness and generalizability.

Study 1

Study 1 examined whether people would condemn word-deed misalignment more in the US (an independently-oriented culture) than in India (an interdependently-oriented culture). The paradigm isolated reactions to misalignment from reactions to misdeeds in general. Specifically, participants read about a target person's misdeed and completed a moral condemnation measure at two points in time: *before* and *after* learning that the target previously preached against the same misdeed. If people condemn word-deed misalignment above and beyond the misdeed itself, then we should observe an increase in condemnation from initial to final ratings. If our cultural hypothesis is correct, then this increase should be larger in the US than in India.

Method

Participants. We recruited from Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online marketplace (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Participants each received \$0.75. In advance of data collection, we decided to request 100 complete responses from Americans in the US and 100 Indians in India; 204 people began the study and one provided insufficient data for analysis. By *a priori* decision, we excluded responses from duplicate IP addresses or MTurk IDs (suggesting multiple responding), from IP addresses outside of either country, from people who were citizens of neither country, or from those who answered at least one attention-check

question incorrectly (described below). These exclusions left 153 people (65 Indians 88 Americans). Indians and Americans were about the same age ($M_s = 33.6$ and 34.3 years, $SD_s = 1.2$ and 1.4), $t(151) = .39$, $p = .700$, but the Indian sample had more males (71% vs. 52%), full-time employees (69% vs. 50%), and people who relied on MTurk as their primary source of income (38% vs. 13%), $\chi^2_s(1) = 5.34$, 5.68 , and 12.57 , respectively; $p_s = .021$, $.017$, and $< .001$. Controlling for these demographic differences or retaining excluded participants did not alter the results' significance (see Appendix S1 in the Online Supplement).

Procedure. After indicating their citizenship, participants read three vignettes in English (presented in randomized orders; see Table 1 for full text). In each vignette, they learned about an employee who had committed a misdeed, they provided *baseline* ratings of moral condemnation, they read that the employee had previously preached against the same misdeed, and they provided *final* moral condemnation ratings. For example, one vignette described a journalist who had committed plagiarism; in between baseline and final ratings, participants learned that she had previously led an anti-plagiarism workshop. If misalignment increases the condemnation of a misdeed, then final ratings should be higher than baseline ratings.

We adapted a moral condemnation measure from previous research (Effron, et al., 2015; Effron & Monin, 2010). Participants evaluated the employees on six semantic differentials, with starred items reverse-coded: Likeable/Dislikable, Mean/Nice*, Good/Bad, Ethical/Unethical, Arrogant/Humble*, Immoral/Moral* (1-6 scales; $\alpha = .92$ across vignettes and baseline/final ratings). They also indicated how much the employees should be punished (1-7 scales: 1 = *not at all*, 4 = *moderately*, 7 = *very harshly*). We analyzed this punitive sentiment measure separately because it had different response options than the moral condemnation items.

We embedded four attention-check questions throughout. Two tested comprehension of the vignettes (multiple-choice); two instructed participants to select a certain response option if they were paying attention.¹

Results and Discussion

Our hypothesis that Americans would react more negatively than Indians to misaligned practicing and preaching predicts a statistical interaction between country and time, such that Americans increase their condemnation and punitive sentiment from baseline more than Indians do after learning about the preaching. To test this interaction, we computed mixed models regressing each dependent measure (i.e., moral condemnation and punishment) on effect codes for country (-1 = India; 1 = U.S.) and time (-1 = baseline measure; 1 = final measure), their interaction, and two dummy codes for the three vignettes' fixed effect, specifying an unstructured covariance matrix. (Because we effect-coded the independent variables, their simple effects can be interpreted as main effects as in ANOVA). To account for the fact that each participant provided ratings at two time points, we allowed random intercepts for participant and random slopes for time.

The results showed that, as expected, Americans reacted more negatively to misalignment than Indians. The predicted interaction was significantly positive for both the moral condemnation measure and the punishment measure; respectively, $b = .22$, $z = 5.03$, $p <$

¹ At the end of the study, we also included individual-difference measures related to cultural traits: two pictorial measures assessing the perceived overlap between the self and others (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Markus & Conner, 2014), the Singelis (1994) Self-Construal Scale, the sociogram task described by Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, and Uskul (2009), and two measures of analytic/holistic thinking (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007; Ji, Zhang, & Nisbett, 2004). We examined whether these measures mediated the cultural differences observed, but given the measures' theoretical and methodological shortcomings (e.g., Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Na et al., 2010; Vignoles et al., 2016) – an issue we address in the General Discussion – we considered these analyses exploratory. We found no evidence of mediation by these individual differences.

.001, $f^2 = .02$ and $b = .17$, $z = 4.06$, $p < .001$, $f^2 = .02$ (see Table 2 and Figure 1)². Simple slopes analysis showed that Americans penalized the employees for misalignment. Specifically, they expressed greater moral condemnation after learning about misalignment (final ratings: $M = 4.82$, $SD = .83$) than before (baseline ratings: $M = 4.29$, $SD = .68$), $d = .69$, $b = .41$, $z = 3.55$, $p < .001$, and they also expressed greater punitive sentiment after learning about misalignment (final ratings: $M = 4.51$, $SD = 1.19$) than before (baseline ratings: $M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.09$), $d = .61$, $b = .70$, $z = 6.36$, $p < .001$. Indians, by contrast, did not penalize the employees for misalignment. Their punishment ratings were statistically equivalent after learning about misalignment (final: $M = 4.57$, $SD = 1.25$) than before (baseline: $M = 4.55$, $SD = .94$), $d = .01$, $b = .02$, $z = .12$, $p = .904$, and their final condemnation ratings ($M = 4.31$, $SD = 1.34$) were *lower* than their baseline ratings ($M = 4.69$, $SD = .91$), suggesting that learning about the employee's preaching *decreased* their condemnation, $d = -.33$, $b = -.49$, $z = 3.58$, $p < .001$. Perhaps Indians gave each employee credit for discharging his or her professional obligation to promote a value that he or she did not privately endorse.

These results support our hypothesis that Americans would increase their condemnation and punitive sentiment from baseline more than Indians after learning about misalignment. We had no predictions about whether this effect would produce a country difference in final ratings, because our theorizing is agnostic about baseline differences. However, it is interesting to note that Indians reacted more negatively at baseline than Americans (see Figure 1), $b = -.39$, $z = 3.08$, $p = .002$ for condemnation and $b = -.74$, $z = 4.05$, $p < .001$ for punishment, and that this

² For the mixed model of the punishment measure to converge, we had to remove the random slope for time. We calculated Cohen's f^2 effect size using the methods outlined by Selya, Rose, Dierker, Hedeker, and Mermelstein (2012), implemented in Stata (see UCLA Statistical Consulting Group, n.d.). We computed d s calculated based on M s and SD s averaged across vignettes.

difference was reversed (in the case of condemnation) or eliminated (in the case of punishment) after participants learned the misdeeds contradicted the employees' preaching, $b = .51$, $z = 2.89$, $p = .004$, and $b = -.06$, $z = .32$, $p = .752$, respectively.

Together, these results provide preliminary evidence that members of a more-independent cultural group react more negatively to misalignment than a more-interdependent cultural group.

Study 2

The purpose of Study 2 was to examine our proposed mechanism: how people explain preaching when it is misaligned with practicing. We expected people from a more independent cultural context (the US) to impute more selfish motives for the preaching than people from a more interdependent cultural context (India). This cultural difference, in turn, should predict how much people condemned the failure to practice.

Participants. In advance of data collection, we decided to request 400 complete responses from MTurk participants (200 Americans in the US and 200 Indians in India). Of the 408 people who began the study, four provided insufficient data for analysis. After applying Study 1's *a priori* exclusion criteria, 378 people remained (186 Indians and 192 Americans). The Indian (vs. American) sample contained slightly younger people ($M_s = 31.7$ and 35.1 years, $SD_s = 11.1$ and 8.5), $t(375) = 3.25$, $p = .001$, more men (78% vs. 53%), and more full-time employees (72% vs. 63%), but about the same number of people who relied on MTurk as their primary source of income (22% vs. 17%), $X^2_s(1) = 27.97$, 3.50 , and 1.38 , respectively; $p_s < .001$, $= .061$, and $< .241$. Controlling for the significant demographic differences or retaining excluded participants did not alter the results' significance (see Appendix S1 in the Online Supplement).

Procedure. Study 2 followed a similar procedure to Study 1. Participants read the vignette about an employee who gets pulled over for speeding (see Table 1). After completing the baseline moral condemnation and punishment measures from Study 1, participants learned the employee had previously led a safe-driving campaign as part of his job. To encourage reflection, participants wrote about why they thought the employee had led the campaign. Next, they indicated how generous or selfish they thought his reasons were for working on the campaign (-3 = *Completely generous*; +3 = *Completely selfish*), whether they thought he worked on it because he was more interested in helping himself versus helping other people (-3 = *Entirely interesting in helping himself*; +3 = *Entirely interested in helping other people*; reverse-coded), and whether they thought he worked on it because he cared more about doing what was best for others versus doing what was best for himself (-3 = *Only about others*; +3 = *Only about himself*). We averaged these three items into a measure of explanations, with higher numbers indicating the employee's reasons were more selfish ($\alpha = .81$). Lastly, participants provided final ratings of moral condemnation and punishment, and answered a comprehension-check question. To simplify the design, Study 2 did not include additional vignettes. With fewer vignettes, there was only one attention check.

Results and Discussion

As expected, the results showed a cultural difference in how people explained the employee's preaching, knowing he failed to practice it. Compared to Indians, Americans inferred that the employee had more individually oriented and selfish (vs. other-oriented and generous) reasons for preaching ($M_{US} = 0.78$, $SD = 1.32$; $M_{India} = 0.39$, $SD = 1.35$), $t(376) = 2.83$, $p = .005$, $d = .29$. This cultural difference, in turn, predicted moral condemnation, consistent with our proposed mechanism (see Figure 2). That is, there was a significant indirect effect from culture

(dummy-coded: US = 1, India = 0), to selfish explanations for preaching, to final condemnation ratings, $b = .16$, bias-corrected 95% CI = [.049, .277] bootstrapped with 5,000 resamples (Hayes, 2013). To isolate condemnation of misalignment from condemnation of the misdeed, this analysis controlled for the baseline condemnation ratings that participants had made of the misdeed before they learned about the misaligned preaching. We also found a significant indirect effect of culture, via explanations, on punishment (controlling for baseline punishment ratings), $b = .13$ [.059, .208].³ Together, these results are consistent with our claim that when a person fails to practice what he preaches, a greater tendency among members of a more-independent (vs. more-interdependent) culture to trace the preaching the selfish motives leads them to express greater moral condemnation and punitive sentiment.

We also tested whether Americans reacted more negatively to misalignment than Indians overall. Following Study 1s' analytic approach, we ran a mixed model predicting condemnation from effect codes for the country (USA = 1, India = -1) and time (final ratings = 1, baseline ratings = -1), plus their interaction, with random intercepts for participants (a model with random slopes for time failed to converge). The coefficient on the interaction was positive, as in Study 1, but not significant, $b = .03$, $z = 1.32$, $p = .186$, $f^2 < .01$. When we tested punishment as the dependent measure, the interaction was not significant either, $b = .01$, $z = .25$, $p = .800$, $f^2 < .01$. Perhaps this was because Study 2 (unlike Study 1) requested explanations for inconsistency before the dependent variable. That is, Study 2 made participants consider explanations that might not otherwise have been salient in their culture, which could have reduced cultural differences on condemnation and punishment. In any case, Study 2's null interactions do not undermine Study 1's results because these interactions were significant when we combined

³ Due to missing data, $ns = 377$ and 376 for the mediation analysis of condemnation and punishment, respectively.

Study 1 and Study 2's data, $b = .13$, $z = 4.85$, $p < .001$, $f^2 = .018$ for the condemnation DV and $b = .10$, $z = 3.29$, $p = .001$, $f^2 = .013$ for the punishment DV, with random slopes for time, a random effect for participant, and a fixed effect for study.

Together, Studies 1 and 2 thus provide initial support for our hypothesis that people react to word-deed misalignment with greater condemnation in an independently-oriented culture than in an interdependently-oriented culture because people in an independently-oriented culture are more likely to attribute such misalignment to self-serving (vs. other-oriented) motives.

Study 3

Study 3 made several adjustments to assess robustness and generalizability. It recruited participants from non-MTurk populations in the US, Japan, and Indonesia, employed different vignettes, and made culturally informed modifications to the condemnation measure. Participants read about a minor employee misdeed; depending on randomly assigned condition, the misdeed either did or did not contradict the employee's prior preaching. Thus, Study 3 manipulated misalignment between subjects, which provides a more conservative test than Study 1 and 2's within-subjects design. We predicted that the same misdeed would elicit greater condemnation when it was misaligned with prior preaching than when it was not, but that this effect would be stronger in the US (an independently oriented country) than in Japan or Indonesia (two interdependently oriented countries).

Method

Participants. We recruited 392 students from universities in one Western culture (the US, $n = 118$, 39% male, $M_{\text{age}} = 23$) and two Asian cultures (Indonesia, $n = 162$, 37% male, $M_{\text{age}} = 19$; and Japan, $n = 112$, 58% male, $M_{\text{age}} = 22$). In the US, subject pool members were emailed a survey invitation; in Japan and Indonesia, surveys were distributed in classes. Although Japan

and Indonesia differ in myriad ways – for example, in the religious beliefs of the majority of citizens, and in their level of economic development – both are more interdependently oriented than the US (see, e.g., Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2002). The number of participants available in an academic term determined the sample size before data analysis. We excluded non-citizens (6 in America, 14 in Japan, and 3 in Indonesia), and 12 people with incomplete responses, leaving a sample of 357. (The conclusions were identical, however, when non-citizens and participants with partially completed responses were retained; see Appendix S1 in the Online Supplement).

Procedure. Participants completed Study 3 in their country’s dominant language after a scale validation study for an unrelated project.

Manipulation. Participants read a vignette about an employee who, as part of his job, preached against either smoking or reckless driving. Then while on vacation, he committed the misdeed of violating either a no-smoking or a safe-driving law himself. (See Appendix for vignette’s full text). Combining these materials created a *misaligned preaching* condition, in which he commits the same misdeed that he preached against, and a *non-misaligned preaching* condition, in which his misdeed is unrelated to his preaching. In a *no preaching* baseline condition, he worked on a publicity campaign that did not involve preaching, and then broke either the no-smoking or the safe-driving law. The design was thus a 3 (condition: misaligned preaching vs. non-misaligned preaching vs. no preaching) X 3 (culture: U.S. vs. Japan vs. Indonesia) factorial.

Measures. We modeled the dependent measure on the moral condemnation scale (Effron, et al., 2015; Effron & Monin, 2010), with two key differences from Studies 1 and 2. First, we made culturally informed changes to the items evaluating the employee. The kind of

person who deserves condemnation from an interdependent perspective is arrogant, makes others lose face, fails to treat others appropriately, and does not adapt him or herself to the demands of the social situation (Davidson, 2002; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Lebra, 2004). To capture these aspects of condemnation in Study 3, we asked participants to rate the employee on two semantic differentials from Studies 1 and 2 (Self-important/Humble, Mean/Nice) and two new ones (Critical/Understanding, Demanding/Accommodating). Participants also indicated how much they agreed the employee was a “morally upstanding person.” Second, following the original measure (Effron & Monin, 2010), participants rated the employee’s *behavior* on three semantic differentials (Perfectly OK/Extremely immoral, Honorable/Dishonorable, and Perfectly fine/Extremely wrong) and indicated how much they agreed that he committed a serious transgression. (Studies 1 and 2 omitted these items to minimize survey length). As in our previous studies, participants also indicated agreement that the employee should be punished. The items asking about agreement were measured on seven-point scales from *Strongly disagree* to *Strongly agree*.

Following previous research (Effron, et al., 2015; Effron & Monin, 2010), we averaged the ten items into a moral condemnation scale, with positively worded items reverse-coded, and each item standardized separately in each culture because different items had different response scales and because the four semantic differentials rating the employee inadvertently had seven points in Japan and six points in the US and Indonesia. The composite displayed good reliability (α s = .79, .73, and .89 in Japan, Indonesia, and the US, respectively).

We also administered exploratory measures, which the Online Supplement lists in full (Appendix S2).

Results and Discussion

If participants reacted negatively to misalignment, then they should express greater condemnation when misdeeds directly contradicted the employee's preaching (misaligned-preaching condition) than when there was no contradiction (non-misaligned preaching and no-preaching conditions). The pattern of means supported this prediction, and, importantly, the effect of misalignment appeared larger in the US sample than the Asian samples (see Figure 3).

Confirming that the manipulation affected condemnation differently in different cultures, there was a significant interaction in a 3 X 3 ANOVA (culture X condition), $F(4, 348) = 6.42, p = .0001, f^2 = .07$. We assessed the magnitude and significance of the manipulation effects by testing, for each culture, the mean difference between the misaligned-preaching condition and the average of the other two conditions. That is, we calculated planned linear contrasts, coding the misaligned-preaching condition as +1 and the other two conditions as -.5, and computing standard errors based on the ANOVA's residual (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). The results showed that misalignment increased condemnation in all three cultures, $ps < .0004$. However, consistent with our predictions, this effect's magnitude was larger among Americans ($d = 1.36$) than among Japanese ($d = .83$) and Indonesians ($d = .61$). (See Table 3 for main and supplemental analyses).

To test whether the effect of misalignment differed significantly across cultures, we computed differences in the linear contrasts described above (denoted by L ; brackets contain 95% CIs). Results confirmed that misalignment had a larger effect in the US compared to Japan, $L = .32 [.01, .64], F(1, 348) = 4.14, p = .043$, and compared to Indonesia, $L = .43 [.15, .71], F(1, 348) = 9.27, p = .003$. The misalignment effect was statistically equivalent in Japan and Indonesia, $L = .11 [-.18, .39], F(1, 348) = .52, p = .47$.

Study 3 thus contributes additional support to our claim that word-deed misalignment can elicit greater condemnation in a culture characterized by independence than in cultures characterized by interdependence. Suggesting this effect is robust, we observed analogous results as in Study 1 despite different participant pools, national origins, vignettes, operationalizations of condemnation, and experimental designs.

Study 4

Having used lab methods to establish, conceptually replicate, and demonstrate a mechanism for our effect, we next assessed generalizability by testing our predictions in a field survey. Whereas participants in Studies 1-3 were MTurk participants or undergraduates judging fictional characters, Study 4 participants were recently-employed MBA students judging a real person from their lives: their former manager. Studies 1-3 adapted a paradigm commonly used in the psychology literature to assess reactions to misalignment: manipulating the misalignment between a character's misdeed and his or her prior preaching, and measuring participants' moral condemnation (e.g., Effron & Monin, 2010). Study 4 adopted the dominant paradigm used to assess reactions to misalignment in the organizational behavior literature: measuring employees' perceptions of how chronically misaligned their manager's words and deeds are, and examining how strongly these perceptions predict distrust of the manager (e.g., Simons, et al., 2007). In this literature, individuals perceived as chronically saying and doing different things are said to be low in *behavioral integrity*, or BI (Simons, 2002).

Previous work established that Western employees distrust managers whom they perceive as low in BI, and that this distrust in turn leads such negative outcomes as poor employee motivation and performance and high turnover (for reviews, see Davis & Rothstein, 2006; Simons, et al., 2014). A recent investigation demonstrates that culture can play a role in how

much BI people ascribe to others, such that someone who breaks a promise is seen as lower in BI in the US than in Taiwan, Korea, and India (Friedman et al., in press). However, it is unclear from this previous work whether low BI is associated with distrust to the same degree in different cultures. Study 4 tested whether this association would be stronger in cultures that foster independence versus interdependence. To assess generalizability beyond East-West differences, we recruited participations from 46 nations that varied in independence.

Study 4 also measured two other important cultural characteristics – power distance and tightness/looseness – to disentangle them from cultural independence, with which they are weakly to moderately correlated (Gelfand et al., 2011; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). In high-power-distance nations, less-powerful individuals expect and respect rigid hierarchies (Hofstede, et al., 2010). Respect for authorities could make employees in such cultures reluctant to express distrust of their managers, even if the managers displayed poor behavioral integrity. Compared to people in loose cultures, people in tight cultures have stronger social norms and are less tolerant of deviant behavior (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; Mu, Kitayama, Han, & Gelfand, 2015). It is difficult to predict our hypothesized results *a priori* from tightness/looseness. On one hand, because different norms apply to different situations, people in tight (vs. loose) cultures could expect higher cross-situational variability of individual behavior, perhaps leading them to be less bothered by word-deed misalignment; on the other hand, people in tight (vs. loose) cultures could be *more* bothered by such misalignment, because they are more bothered by deviant behavior in general. Nonetheless, we tested whether the hypothesized effects of cultural independence would remain robust when accounting for tightness/looseness and power distance.

Method

Participants. To fulfill a course requirement, all full-time and executive MBA students in an international business school's introductory organizational behavior course completed an online survey, in which Study 4 was embedded. Of the 395 who provided sufficient responses for analysis, 15 did not consent to having their data analyzed for research, and we could not analyze 6 participants' responses because we lacked data on their nation's degree of independence. We excluded the 62 people who failed an attention check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), described below, and the 84 who held multiple citizenships, because our theory does not make predictions about multicultural identities. (The results' direction and significance was identical, however, when we retained inattentive and multicultural participants, except that the one marginally significant effect reported below became significant; see Online Supplement, Appendix S1). The final sample contained 228 students (197 full-time, and 31 executive; 148 men, 80 women) from 46 nations. The independent nations tended to be in North America and Western Europe, whereas the interdependent ones were in Asia and Latin America (see Table 4).

Behavioral Integrity. Participants first rated their most recent manager (or current manager, if applicable) on the 8-item BI scale, which assesses the degree of chronic alignment between words and deeds (sample item: "My manager practiced what he/she preached"; five response options ranged from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree; $\alpha = .94$; Simons, et al., 2007).

Trust. Seven items (taken from Mayer & Gavin, 2005; Simons, et al., 2007) measured trust (e.g., "If I had my way, I wouldn't have let my manager have any influence over issues that are important to me;" $\alpha = .73$; five response options ranged from *Strongly disagree* to *Strongly agree*). We chose these items because they have been used in previous BI research (Palanski &

Yammarino, 2011; Simons, et al., 2007).

Independence/Interdependence. Using a standard database of countries' cultural characteristics (Hofstede, et al., 2010), we assigned an independence score to each participant based on the country in which he or she reported having lived the longest. Scores in our sample ranged from 12 to 91, with higher numbers indicating greater independence ($M = 59.73$, $SD = 25.34$; see Table 4).⁴

Power distance. We assigned each participant a power distance score from Hofstede and colleagues' (2010) database based on where he or she had lived the longest. Scores in our sample ranged from 11 to 104 ($M = 54.79$, $SD = 19.92$; see Table 4).

Tightness/looseness. We assigned participants a cultural tightness/looseness score corresponding to the nation where they had lived longest, based on data reported by Gelfand, et al. (2011). Because tightness data were only available for 27 of the countries in our sample, we could only assign scores to 178 participants. Scores in our sample ranged from 1.6 to 11.8 ($M = 6.74$, $SD = 2.31$; see Table 4).

Organizational commitment. We also included a six-item measure of organizational affective commitment (sample item: "I do not feel 'emotionally attached' to this organization", reverse-coded; response options ranged from -3 = Strongly disagree to 3 = Strongly agree; alpha = .87; Meyer, Allen, & Smith, 1993). In previous research, high-BI managers had more committed employees (Leroy, Palanski, & Simons, 2012). We explored whether this relationship would differ by culture, though our predictions were tentative because, compared to manager trustworthiness, feelings about an organization are more distal from manager BI (Leroy et al.,

⁴ We used data file version "2015 12 08" from <http://geerthofstede.nl/research--vsm>. We used individualism/collectivism as a proxy for independence/interdependence because individualistic societies foster interdependent models of self (Hofstede et al., 2010; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

2012).

Table 5 shows the correlations among the independent and dependent variables. The only other measures were unrelated to the hypotheses (e.g., decision-making problems for a class exercise). All materials were in English.

Results

To examine whether the relationship between trust and BI differed by culture, we regressed trust on BI and independence (both mean-centered), plus their interaction, in a mixed model with random intercepts for country, a random slope for BI, and an unstructured covariance matrix. Replicating previous studies, high-BI managers were trusted more, $b = .40$, $z = 8.54$, $p < .001$ (see Simons, et al., 2014), $f^2 = .14$.⁵ Also consistent with prior work, people whose cultures emphasized independence (vs. interdependence) trusted their managers more overall, $b = .005$, $z = 3.38$, $p = .001$, $f^2 = .06$ (see Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010). Most importantly, supporting our hypothesis, the relationship between BI and trust was stronger in independent than in interdependent cultures, as shown by a significantly positive interaction, $b = .004$, $z = 2.42$, $p = .016$, $f^2 = .02$ (see Figure 4).

To examine the nature of this interaction, we computed the simple slope of trust on BI across the full range of interdependence scores included in our sample. Although the relationship between BI and trust weakened as independence scores decreased, this relationship was significantly positive at both the highest and lowest score, representing, respectively, the USA (independence score = 91), $b = .54$, $z = 7.00$, $p < .001$, and Venezuela (independence score = 12), $b = .19$, $z = 1.98$, $p = .048$.

⁵ Because we mean-centered the independent variables, simple effects are computed at the sample mean of the other predictors, and can thus be interpreted as main effects as in ANOVA.

We found no evidence that power distance or cultural tightness/looseness could explain these results. When we entered power distance (mean-centered) and its interaction with (mean-centered) BI into the regression model, the interaction between BI and independence remained significant, $b = .005$, $z = 1.98$, $p = .048$.⁶ Neither power distance nor its interaction with BI were significant predictors, $|b|s < .002$, z s $< .35$, p s $> .72$. When we replaced power distance with cultural tightness (mean-centered), the interaction between BI and independence remained marginally significant, $b = .005$, $z = 1.75$, $p = .081$, and neither tightness nor its interaction with BI were significant, $|b|s < .02$, z s $< .82$, p s $> .41$ (the sample size for this analysis was smaller because tightness scores were only available for 178 participants). Thus, our results appear driven by independence above and beyond power distance or tightness.

We also found no evidence of cultural differences in the relationship between the managers' BI and students' organizational affective commitment $b = -.006$, $z = 1.25$, $p = .210$, $f^2 < .01$. (Thirty-one participants did not respond to the commitment measure, leaving 197 for this analysis). Because a manager's behavior is only one of many reasons why an employee would feel committed to an organization, this measure may have been too noisy to detect any cultural differences related to managers' BI.

Discussion

Across 46 nations, the more word-deed misalignment managers were perceived as displaying, the less their employees trusted them. As predicted, this relationship was stronger among people from the independently-oriented cultures of North America and Western Europe than among people from the interdependently-oriented cultures of Asia and Latin America.

Previous theorizing would have predicted the reverse pattern based on the claim that

⁶ The mixed model failed to converge using an unstandardized covariance structure, so we report results using an independent covariance structure.

predictability is a more important component of trustworthiness in interdependent than in independent cultures (Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998). Inconsistency makes a person's behavior more difficult to predict, but – consistent with our theorizing – it fits better with the dominant model of self in cultures emphasizing interdependence.

Because we measured, rather than manipulated, perceptions of misalignment, the usual caveats about correlation and causation apply. Nonetheless, Study 4 is the first to show that cultural differences the relationship between perceptions of misalignment and trust can be documented in real-world contexts with judgments of important individuals in participants' lives.

General Discussion

Practicing exactly what you preach at all times may be an unrealistic goal, yet failing to do so can expose one to severely negative interpersonal reactions in Western cultural contexts. Our research suggests that misaligned practicing and preaching elicits less severe interpersonal reactions outside the West. In Studies 1-3, participants condemned someone more for the same misdeed when it represented a failure to practice what he preached than when it did not. However, misalignment had a larger effect on condemnation among Americans than among Japanese, Indonesians, or Indians. Across 46 nations in Study 4, the more interdependent a participant's national culture, the less likely the participant was to distrust a manager for chronically "saying one thing but doing another." Overall, then, we find that word-deed misalignment is more problematic in cultures that emphasize independence than in those that emphasize interdependence.

What explains these cultural differences? Study 2 found evidence that when someone's practicing and preaching are misaligned, people explain the preaching differently depending on the prominent model of self in their culture. Americans imputed more selfish (and less generous)

intentions than Indian participants, which in turn predicted greater moral condemnation of the misalignment. Self-interested reasons for preaching (and not practicing) a value resonate with the independent model of self, and connote hypocrisy (Monin & Merritt, 2012) by suggesting that a person is feigning virtue. Other-oriented reasons are more salient in contexts in which the interdependent model is more practiced and in which normatively good actions require being receptive to important others (Markus, 2016). Where such relationships are thought to define the self, preaching (but not practicing) a value can signal that one wants to help others, not that one is feigning virtue.

Our results suggest that people in independent (vs. interdependent) cultures are less tolerant of word-deed misalignment in particular, but do not suggest they are less tolerant of wrongdoing in general. Participants in Studies 1–3 indicated how much they would condemn someone who committed a misdeed and who either had or had not previously preached against it. We found that the additional condemnation received for misalignment *above and beyond the condemnation received for the misdeed* was larger in independent than in interdependent cultures. The idea that people in independent cultures are less tolerant of wrongdoing cannot account for this finding.

For the same reason, our results do not simply reflect a general tendency to attribute wrongdoing to dispositions in the West and situations outside the West (Morris & Peng, 1994). For example, in Study 1, Indians expressed greater baseline moral condemnation of people who had committed misdeeds than Americans. It was only when participants learned that the misdeeds represented a failure to practice what they preached that Americans expressed greater moral condemnation than Indians (see Figure 1). If moral condemnation simply reflected dispositional attributions for wrongdoing, and if Americans were more likely than Indians to

make such attributions, then we should have instead observed Americans expressing greater condemnation than Indians even before they knew about the preaching. Thus, it is hard to explain the statistical interaction we observed solely based on cultural differences in a tendency to make dispositional attributions about wrongdoing.

However, a more nuanced explanation based on dispositional attributions could complement our proposed mechanism. Because people in Western cultural contexts typically expect words and dispositions to correspond (Gilbert & Malone, 1995), they may tend to interpret an act of *preaching* virtue as a claim of *being* virtuous (Efron, et al., 2015; Howe & Monin, 2017; Jordan, et al., 2017). For example, a manager who preaches the importance of charitable giving might be seen as claiming to have a charitable disposition. If she then declines to donate to charity, her preaching would in retrospect seem like an attempt to feign virtue – the hallmark of hypocrisy (cf. Batson, et al., 1999). By contrast, because people outside the West are more likely to expect words to reflect situations (Choi, et al., 1999), they may not tend to interpret preaching as a claim about dispositional virtue. In this view, acting uncharitably would not make preaching look like feigned virtue, and would thus not invite the same degree of condemnation or distrust as in the West. This potential role of situational attributions dovetails with our idea that preaching seems less selfishly motivated – less like feigned virtue – in cultures fostering independence. Investigating this potential role of attributions in judging misalignment would enrich our understanding of process.

Theoretical Implications

Theories in psychology, management, marketing, and political science assume that keeping your words and deeds aligned is essential to make a positive impression on others (e.g., Bhatti, Hansen, & Olsen, 2013; Cha & Edmondson, 2006; Efron & Miller, 2015; Hale & Pillow,

2015; Hennig-Thurau, Groth, Paul, & Gremler, 2006; Simons, 2002), especially in the moral domain (Kreps, Laurin, & Merritt, 2017). For example, aspiring leaders are told that success requires “walking their talk” (Kouzes & Posner, 2011; Simons, 2008). Our studies reveal for the first time that the importance – and even perceived morality – of such alignment depends on culture. The premium placed on consistency follows from a Western, independent model of self, whereas a premium placed on flexibility and privileging role requirements over personal preferences fits better with an interdependent model. People outside of Western culture do care about the congruence between words and deeds, but not as much. By incorporating the role of culture, these theories can better predict how people will be judged when they promote ideals that they do not privately hold or uphold. Word-deed misalignment may be “universally decried” in the literature (Simons, et al., 2007, p. 651), but it is not condemned as harshly all over the world.

What counts as hypocrisy? Current theories offer little consensus (e.g., Alicke, et al., 2013; Graham, et al., 2015; Hale & Pillow, 2015; Monin & Merritt, 2012). In our view, failing to practice what you preach is not sufficient to receive condemnation as a hypocrite, despite what some theories would suggest (e.g., Simons, 2002; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971). Instead, we argue that misaligned practice and preaching receives condemnation only when it signals that someone has been trying to appear more virtuous than he or she really is. If this idea is correct, then people should react most negatively to word-deed misalignment in contexts that support a sharp distinction between “how someone appears” and “who someone really is.” Supporting this prediction, we observed greater aversion to such misalignment in independently oriented cultures, which view public appearances as separate from the true self, than in interdependently oriented cultures, where the self is inextricably linked to relevant others’ views

and expectations, and thus to public behavior. In this way, our findings deepen understanding of what counts as hypocrisy.

Our research also advances theories of morality and culture. Existing theories focus on cultural differences in moral practices and values (e.g., Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012), and the “moral foundations” on which these differences are built, such as care, fairness, loyalty, purity, and authority (Graham et al., 2013; see also Shweder, 1997). By contrast, we argue that cultures differ not only in their moral foundations, but also in how they respond to inconsistent behavior within a given foundation. For example, moral foundations theory (MFT) and its predecessors (Graham, et al., 2013; Shweder, 1997) would predict that because the “authority” foundation is more important in India than the US, disobeying a superior’s orders would receive harsher condemnation in India. However, our theory (and not MFT) would predict that Americans increase their condemnation more than Indians upon learning that someone who had disobeyed an order previously preached obedience (cf. Study 1). Thus, to understand how people will judge another’s morally relevant actions, it is important to consider not only whether the actions violated a culturally important moral value or foundation, but also to consider how cultures will view these actions in the context of the person’s previous behavior.

Limitations and Future Directions

Our theoretical analysis focused on independence and interdependence. Study 4 found no evidence that power distance or cultural tightness/looseness could explain the results. However, it is possible that other cultural factors that tend to accompany interdependence contribute to these effects as well. For example, people in interdependent cultures tend to default to a *dialectic* style of reasoning (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000; Nisbett, et al., 2001; Oyserman & Lee, 2007), which promotes acceptance of contradictions, paradox, and inconsistency (Peng & Nisbett, 1999;

Zhang, Waldman, Han, & Li, 2015) – unlike the *analytic* style more prominent in independent cultures. Word-deed misalignment may be less problematic in interdependent contexts because it fits with the dialectic style. Testing the role of dialectical thinking would further enrich understanding of how culture shapes reactions to inconsistency.

Future research should also examine whether reactions to word-deed misalignment depend on cultural diversities other than those that derive from national origin. For example, within the U. S., working-class backgrounds and many religious orientations (with the exception of main-line Protestantism) tend to foster interdependence (Markus & Conner, 2014; Stephens, Fryberg, & Markus, 2012). We would thus expect that people from U.S. working-class backgrounds and religious individuals who are not mainline Protestants would levy smaller penalties against word-deed misalignment (cf. Cohen & Rozin, 2001).

It would also be interesting to examine whether culture shapes interpersonal reactions to word-deed misalignment besides moral condemnation and distrust. We measured condemnation and distrust because these outcomes were the focus of previous work on misalignment (e.g., Effron & Monin, 2010; Simons, 2002). However, we would expect similar effects of culture and misalignment on other interpersonal reactions. For example, in two follow-up studies (described in the Online Supplement's Appendix S3), we found that in both the US and Japan, employees were more satisfied with supervision from managers whom they viewed as high (vs. low) in behavioral integrity. However, complementing Study 4, the relationship between behavioral integrity and satisfaction was significantly stronger in the US than in Japan, $p = .011$.

As in much research, we operationalized culture at the country level, capturing national differences but not individual variations. Individual-level measures of independence and interdependence exist (e.g., Singelis, 1994), but are controversial (see Cross, et al., 2011), in part

because “cultural differences are not always reducible to individual differences” (Na, et al., 2010, p. 6192). Individual-difference measures capture only limited elements of interdependence and interdependence (Vignoles, et al., 2016) because these models of self exist not only in individuals’ psychological tendencies, but also in pervasive ideas, institutional policies, organizations, norms, and everyday social interactions that afford these psychological tendencies (Markus & Conner, 2014). Moreover, research casts serious doubts on existing measures’ construct validity (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Kitayama, et al., 2009; Levine et al., 2003; Na, et al., 2010). For these reasons, we were not confident that individual differences in interdependence as assessed by available scales would mediate the national differences we observed. Nonetheless, new measurement advances could allow future work to test our hypotheses at the individual level (Vignoles, et al., 2016).

Practical Implications

The results have important implications for collaboration among people from diverse cultural backgrounds. For example, a Venezuelan manager may erroneously assume that her US employees understand that her role sometimes requires her to say one thing but do another, and not anticipate how much her behavior undermines her employees’ trust in her (cf. Study 4). Similarly, managers’ cultural backgrounds likely affect their judgments of employees when it comes to performance evaluations, promotion, and responses to employee wrongdoing. For example, a Western European manager may penalize Asian employees for misalignment that they did not anticipate would be problematic, such as comports themselves outside the office inconsistently with the values they promote at work (cf. Studies 1–3). Although future research is needed to test these implications, our work raises the possibility that people may struggle to predict how negatively others will react to word-deed misalignment across cultures. Improving

these predictions could help people weigh the costs and benefits of prioritizing consistency over other social and moral concerns, such as the importance of tuning one's words and deeds to the shifting demands of different social roles, audiences, or situations.

Conclusion

Our results document an important aspect of diversity with broad implications. Cultural differences in the importance of alignment between words and deeds could shape not only how people evaluate each other in everyday life, but also how the public reacts to corporate and political scandals, or how judges and juries punish wrongdoing. Our results highlight the potential for cultural misunderstandings and conflict surrounding issues of alleged hypocrisy. The condemnation you receive for failing to practice what you preach will depend on the culture in which you preach.

Open Practices

The exact materials administered in each study, including any measures included for exploratory purposes or for unrelated studies, can be found online at <https://osf.io/xy4c6/>. Please see the Online Supplement's Appendix S2 for an explanation of Study 3's exploratory measures.

References

- Alicke, M. D., Gordon, E., & Rose, D. (2013). Hypocrisy: What counts? *Philosophical Psychology*, *26*(5), 673-701.
- Arnett, J. J. (2008). The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs to become less American. *American Psychologist*, *63*(7), 602-614.
- Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the structure of interpersonal closeness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *63*(4), 596.
- Barden, J., Rucker, D. D., & Petty, R. E. (2005). "Saying one thing and doing another": Examining the impact of event order on hypocrisy judgments of others. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *31*(11), 1463-1474.
- Barden, J., Rucker, D. D., Petty, R. E., & Rios, K. (2014). Order of actions mitigates hypocrisy judgments for ingroup more than outgroup members. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *17*(5), 590-601.
- Batson, C. D., Thompson, E. R., Seufferling, G., Whitney, H., & Strongman, J. A. (1999). Moral hypocrisy: Appearing moral to oneself without being so. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *77*(3), 525-537.
- Bhatti, Y., Hansen, K. M., & Olsen, A. L. (2013). Political hypocrisy: The effect of political scandals on candidate evaluations. *Acta Politica*, *48*(4), 408-428.
- Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *6*(1), 3-5.
- Cha, S. E., & Edmondson, A. C. (2006). When values backfire: Leadership, attribution, and disenchantment in a values-driven organization. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *17*, 57-78.

- Choi, I., Koo, M., & Choi, J. A. (2007). Individual differences in analytic versus holistic thinking. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33(5), 691-705.
- Choi, I., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Cultural psychology of surprise: Holistic theories and recognition of contradiction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79, 890–905.
- Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal attribution across cultures: Variation and universality. *Psychological Bulletin*, 125(1), 47.
- Church, A. T., Katigbak, M. S., Ibáñez-Reyes, J., de Jesús Vargas-Flores, J., Curtis, G. J., Tanaka-Matsumi, J., . . . Shen, J. (2014). Relating self-concept consistency to hedonic and eudaimonic well-being in eight cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 45(5), 695-712.
- Cohen, A. B., & Rozin, P. (2001). Religion and the morality of mentality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81(4), 697.
- Cross, S. E., Gore, J. S., & Morris, M. L. (2003). The relational-interdependent self-construal, self-concept consistency, and well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85(5), 933.
- Cross, S. E., Hardin, E. E., & Gercek-Swing, B. (2011). The what, how, why, and where of self-construal. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 15, 142-179.
- Davidson, R. J. (2002). *Visions of compassion: Western scientists and Tibetan Buddhists examine human nature*: Oxford University Press.
- Davis, A. L., & Rothstein, H. R. (2006). The effects of the perceived behavioral integrity of managers on employee attitudes: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 67(4), 407-419.
- Doi, T. (1986). *The anatomy of the self: The individual versus society*. Tokyo: Kodansha.

- Doney, P. M., Cannon, J. P., & Mullen, M. R. (1998). Understanding the influence of national culture on the development of trust. *Academy of Management Review*, 23(3), 601-620.
- Effron, D. A., Lucas, B. J., & O'Connor, K. (2015). Hypocrisy by association: When organizational membership increases condemnation for wrongdoing. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 130, 147-159.
- Effron, D. A., & Miller, D. T. (2015). Do as I say, not as I've done: Suffering for a misdeed reduces the hypocrisy of advising others against it. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 131, 16-32.
- Effron, D. A., & Monin, B. (2010). Letting people off the hook: When do good deeds excuse transgressions? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 36, 1618-1634.
- English, T., & Chen, S. (2007). Culture and self-concept stability: Consistency across and within contexts among Asian Americans and European Americans. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 93(3), 478.
- Ferrin, D. L., & Gillespie, N. (2010). Trust differences across national-societal cultures: Much to do, or much ado about nothing? In M. N. K. Saunders, D. Skinner, G. Dietz, N. Gillespie & R. Lewicki (Eds.), *Organizational trust: A cultural perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fiske, A. P., Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., & Nisbett, R. E. (1998). The cultural matrix of social psychology. In D. Gilbert & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Friedman, R., Hong, Y.-Y., Simons, T., Chi, S.-C., Oh, S.-H., & Lachowicz, M. (in press). The impact of culture on reactions to promise breaches: Differences between East and West in Behavioral Integrity perceptions. *Group and Organization Management*.

Gelfand, M. J., Nishii, L. H., & Raver, J. L. (2006). On the nature and importance of cultural tightness-looseness. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 91*(6), 1225.

Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L. M., Lun, J., Lim, B. C., . . . Yamaguchi, S. (2011). Differences Between Tight and Loose Cultures: A 33-Nation Study. *Science, 332*(6033), 1100-1104.

Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. *Psychological Bulletin, 117*(1), 21-38.

Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 47*, 55-130.

Graham, J., Meindl, P., Koleva, S., Iyer, R., & Johnson, K. M. (2015). When values and behavior conflict: Moral pluralism and intrapersonal moral hypocrisy. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 9*(3), 158-170.

Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the moral domain. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101*(2), 366.

Hale, W. J., & Pillow, D. R. (2015). Asymmetries in perceptions of self and others' hypocrisy: Rethinking the meaning and perception of the construct. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 45*(1), 88-98.

Hayes, A. F. (2013). *Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach*. New York: Guilford.

Heine, S. J., & Lehman, D. R. (1997). Culture, dissonance, and self-affirmation. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23*, 389-400.

- Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1999). Is there a universal need for positive self-regard? *Psychological Review*, *106*(4), 766.
- Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Peng, K., & Greenholtz, J. (2002). What's wrong with cross-cultural comparisons of subjective Likert scales?: The reference-group effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *82*(6), 903-918.
- Hennig-Thurau, T., Groth, M., Paul, M., & Gremler, D. D. (2006). Are all smiles created equal? How emotional contagion and emotional labor affect service relationships. *Journal of Marketing*, *70*(3), 58-73.
- Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *33*(2-3), 61-83.
- Hodges, B. H., & Geyer, A. L. (2006). A nonconformist account of the Asch experiments: Values, pragmatics, and moral dilemmas. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *10*, 2-19.
- Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind* (3rd ed.): McGraw-Hill.
- Hoshino-Browne, E., Zanna, A. S., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., Kitayama, S., & Lackenbauer, S. (2005). On the cultural guises of cognitive dissonance: The case of Easterners and Westerners. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *89*(3), 294.
- Howe, L. C., & Monin, B. (2017). Healthier than thou? “Practicing what you preach” backfires by increasing anticipated devaluation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *112*(5), 718-735.
- Ji, L.-J., Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Culture, control, and perception of relationships in the environment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *78*(5), 943.

- Ji, L.-J., Zhang, Z., & Nisbett, R. E. (2004). Is it culture or is it language? Examination of language effects in cross-cultural research on categorization. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87*(1), 57.
- Jordan, J. J., Sommers, R., Bloom, P., & Rand, D. G. (2017). Why do we hate hypocrites? Evidence for a theory of false signaling. *Psychological Science, 28*(3), 189-202.
- Kannan-Narasimhan, R., & Lawrence, B. S. (2012). Behavioral integrity: How leader referents and trust matter to workplace outcomes. *Journal of Business Ethics, 111*(2), 165-178.
- Kitayama, S., & Markus, H. R. (1999). Yin and yang of the Japanese self: The cultural psychology of coherence. In I. D. Cervone & Y. Shoda (Eds.), *The coherence of personality: Social cognitive bases of personality consistency, variability, and organization*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Kitayama, S., Park, H., Sevincer, A. T., Karasawa, M., & Uskul, A. K. (2009). A cultural task analysis of implicit independence: Comparing North America, Western Europe, and East Asia. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97*(2), 236-255.
- Kitayama, S., Snibbe, A. C., Markus, H. R., & Suzuki, T. (2004). Is there any "free" choice? Self and dissonance in two cultures. *Psychological Science, 15*(8), 527-533.
- Kouzes, J. M., & Posner, B. Z. (2011). *Credibility: How leaders gain and lose it; Why people demand it*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Kreps, T. A., Laurin, K., & Merritt, A. C. (2017). Hypocritical flip-flop, or courageous evolution? When leaders change their moral minds. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 113*(5), 730-752.
- Kurzban, R. (2010). *Why everyone (else) is a hypocrite*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Lammers, J. (2012). Abstraction increases hypocrisy. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48*(2), 475-480.
- Lammers, J., Stapel, D., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010). Power increases hypocrisy: Moralizing in reasoning, immorality in behavior. *Psychological Science, 21*(5), 737-744.
- Laurent, S. M., Clark, B. A. M., Walker, S., & Wiseman, K. D. (2013). Punishing hypocrisy: The roles of hypocrisy and moral emotions in deciding culpability and punishment of criminal and civil moral transgressors. *Cognition and Emotion, 1-25*.
- Lebra, T. S. (2004). *The Japanese self in cultural logic*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Leroy, H., Dierynck, B., Anseel, F., Simons, T., Halbesleben, J. R., McCaughey, D., . . . Sels, L. (2012). Behavioral integrity for safety, priority of safety, psychological safety, and patient safety: A team-level study. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 97*(6), 1273.
- Leroy, H., Palanski, M. E., & Simons, T. (2012). Authentic leadership and behavioral integrity as drivers of follower commitment and performance. *Journal of Business Ethics, 107*(3), 255-264.
- Levine, T. R., Bresnahan, M. J., Park, H. S., Lapinski, M. K., Wittenbaum, G. M., Shearman, S. M., . . . Ohashi, R. (2003). Self-construal scales lack validity. *Human Communication Research, 29*(2), 210-252.
- Lillard, A. (1998). Ethnopsychologies: cultural variations in theories of mind. *Psychological Bulletin, 123*, 3-32.
- Malle, B. F. (1999). How people explain behavior: A new theoretical framework. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3*(1), 23-48.
- Malle, B. F. (2011). Time to give up the dogmas of attribution: An alternative theory of behavior explanation. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 44*(1), 297-311.

- Markus, H. R. (2016). What moves people to action? Culture and motivation. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, 8, 161-166.
- Markus, H. R., & Conner, A. (2014). *Clash! How to thrive in a multicultural world*. New York: Penguin.
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review*, 98, 224–253.
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2003). Models of agency: Sociocultural diversity in the construction of action. In V. Murphy-Berman & J. J. Berman (Eds.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation* (Vol. 49, pp. 1-58): University of Nebraska Press.
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2010). Cultures and selves. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 5(4), 420-430.
- Mayer, R. C., & Gavin, M. B. (2005). Trust in management and performance: Who minds the shop while the employees watch the boss? *Academy of Management Journal*, 48(5), 874-888.
- Meyer, J. P., Allen, N. J., & Smith, C. A. (1993). Commitment to organizations and occupations: Extension and test of a three-component conceptualization. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 78(4), 538.
- Monin, B., & Merritt, A. C. (2012). Moral hypocrisy, moral inconsistency, and the struggle for moral integrity. In M. Mikulincer & P. Shaver (Eds.), *The social psychology of morality: Exploring the causes of good and evil* (pp. 167-202). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

- Morling, B., Kitayama, S., & Miyamoto, Y. (2002). Cultural practices emphasize influence in the United States and adjustment in Japan. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28(3), 311-323.
- Morris, M. W., & Peng, K. (1994). Culture and cause: American and Chinese attributions for social and physical events. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67, 949-971.
- Mu, Y., Kitayama, S., Han, S., & Gelfand, M. J. (2015). How culture gets embrained: Cultural differences in event-related potentials of social norm violations. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 112(50), 15348-15353.
- Na, J., Grossmann, I., Varnum, M. E. W., Kitayama, S., Gonzalez, R., & Nisbett, R. E. (2010). Cultural differences are not always reducible to individual differences. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 107(14), 6192-6197.
- Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of thought: Holistic versus analytic cognition. *Psychological Review*, 108(2), 291.
- Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 45, 867-872.
- Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W.-S. (2007). Priming "culture": Culture as situated cognition. In S. Kitayama & D. Cohen (Eds.), *Handbook of cultural psychology* (pp. 255-279). New York: Guilford Press.
- Palanski, M. E., Kahai, S. S., & Yammarino, F. J. (2011). Team virtues and performance: An examination of transparency, behavioral integrity, and trust. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 99(2), 201-216.

- Palanski, M. E., & Yammarino, F. J. (2011). Impact of behavioral integrity on follower job performance: A three-study examination. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 22(4), 765-786.
- Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (1999). Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction. *American Psychologist*, 54(9), 741.
- Polman, E., & Ruttan, R. L. (2012). Effects of anger, guilt, and envy on moral hypocrisy. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 38(1), 129-139.
- Powell, C. A. J., & Smith, R. H. (2012). Schadenfreude caused by the exposure of hypocrisy in others. *Self and Identity*, 1-19.
- Riemer, H., Shavitt, S., Koo, M., & Markus, H. R. (2014). Preferences don't have to be personal: Expanding attitude theorizing with a cross-cultural perspective. *Psychological Review*, 121(4), 619-648.
- Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R. L. (1985). *Contrast analysis: Focused comparisons in the analysis of variance*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Savani, K., Markus, H. R., & Conner, A. L. (2008). Let your preference be your guide?: Preferences and choices are more tightly linked for North Americans than for Indians. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95(4), 861-876.
- Schimmack, U., Oishi, S., & Diener, E. (2002). Cultural influences on the relation between pleasant emotions and unpleasant emotions: Asian dialectic philosophies or individualism-collectivism? *Cognition and Emotion*, 16, 705-719.
- Selya, A. S., Rose, J. S., Dierker, L. C., Hedeker, D., & Mermelstein, R. J. (2012). A practical guide to calculating Cohen's $f(2)$, a measure of local effect size, from PROC MIXED. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 3, 1-6.

- Shweder, R. A. (1997). The “big three” of morality (Autonomy, Community and Divinity) and the “big three” explanations of suffering. In A. M. Brandt & P. Rozin (Eds.), *Morality and Health*. New York: Routledge.
- Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology: Undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant. *Psychological Science*, 22(11), 1359-1366.
- Simons, T. (2002). Behavioral integrity: The perceived alignment between managers' words and deeds as a research focus. *Organization Science*, 13(1), 18-35.
- Simons, T. (2008). *The integrity dividend: Leading by the power of your word*. San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons.
- Simons, T., Friedman, R., Liu, L. A., & McLean Parks, J. (2007). Racial differences in sensitivity to behavioral integrity: Attitudinal consequences, in-group effects, and "trickle down" among Black and non-Black employees. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 92(3), 650.
- Simons, T., Leroy, H., Collewaert, V., & Masschelein, S. (2014). How leader alignment of words and deeds affects followers: A meta-analysis of behavioral integrity research. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 1-14.
- Singelis, T. M. (1994). The measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 20(5), 580-591.
- Stephens, N. M., Fryberg, S. A., & Markus, H. R. (2012). It's your choice: How the middle-class model of independence disadvantages working-class Americans. In S. T. Fiske & H. R. Markus (Eds.), *Facing social class: How societal rank influences interaction* (pp. 87-106). New York: Russel Sage.

Stephens, N. M., Fryberg, S. A., Markus, H. R., Johnson, C. S., & Covarrubias, R. (2012).

Unseen disadvantage: How American universities' focus on independence undermines the academic performance of first-generation college students. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *102*(6), 1178-1197.

Stephens, N. M., Hamedani, M. G., Markus, H. R., Bergsieker, H. B., & Eloul, L. (2009). Why

did they “choose” to stay? Perspectives of Hurricane Katrina observers and survivors. *Psychological Science*, *20*(7), 878-886.

Stone, J., & Fernandez, N. C. (2008). To practice what we preach: The use of hypocrisy and

cognitive dissonance to motivate behavior change. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *2*(2), 1024-1051.

Suh, E. M. (2002). Culture, identity consistency, and subjective well-being. *Journal of*

Personality and Social Psychology, *83*, 1378-1391.

Sverdlik, N., Roccas, S., & Sagiv, L. (2012). Morality across cultures: A value perspective. In M.

Mikulincer & P. Shaver (Eds.), *The social psychology of morality: Exploring the causes of good and evil*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Tedeschi, J. T., Schlenker, B. R., & Bonoma, T. V. (1971). Cognitive dissonance: Private

ratiocination or public spectacle? *American Psychologist*, *26*, 685-695.

Triandis, H. C. (1995). *Individualism and collectivism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

UCLA Statistical Consulting Group. (n.d.). How can I estimate effect size for mixed models?

Stata FAQ Retrieved November 20, 2017, from <https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/faq/how-can-i-estimate-effect-size-for-mixed/>

Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2007). Moral hypocrisy: Social groups and the flexibility of

virtue. *Psychological Science*, *18*(8), 689-689.

Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2008). The duality of virtue: Deconstructing the moral hypocrite.

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(5), 1334-1334.

Vignoles, V. L., Owe, E., Becker, M., Smith, P. B., Easterbrook, M. J., Brown, R., . . . Bond, M.

H. (2016). Beyond the "East-West" dichotomy: Global variation in cultural models of selfhood. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145*, 966-1000.

Zhang, Y., Waldman, D. A., Han, Y.-L., & Li, X.-B. (2015). Paradoxical leader behaviors in people management: Antecedents and consequences. *Academy of Management Journal, 58*(2), 538-566.

Tables

Table 1

Full Text of Vignettes Used in Study 1

	Speeding	Plagiarism	Drug use
Part I	[Name1] works for a non-profit organization whose goal is to improve the safety and wellbeing of people across the country. Recently, while on vacation, [Name1] was by himself, running late to meet his closest friends at dinner, when he was pulled over for driving nearly [50 kilometers / 30 miles] per hour over the speed limit.	[Name2] is a journalist who works at a newspaper. While writing an article, she copied two sentences word-for-word from a book without giving the original author credit.	[Name3] has been a high school teacher for the past ten years. While traveling outside of the country on vacation, he was caught purchasing and using cocaine.
Part II	A year before the incident you just read about, [Name1]'s boss asked him to work on a safe-driving publicity campaign, and [Name1] agreed. As part of the campaign, he put together advertisements about the importance of driving safely and lobbied the government to increase penalties for reckless drivers.	As an employee of the newspaper, part of [Name2]'s job is to lead a week-long workshop to train newly hired journalists. For this workshop, she is required to emphasize the newspaper's commitment to honesty and integrity. She always tells the new journalists not to copy other people's work, and that the penalties for plagiarism are high.	The state curriculum requires [Name3] to teach her students about the dangers of drug use. Thus, for the last years, [Name3] has been urging his students not to use illegal drugs, explaining the health risks, and informing them of the legal consequences of using them.

Note. Participants made baseline ratings after reading Part I, and final ratings after reading Part II. Name1, Name2, and Name3 were, respectively, Stewart, Andrew, and Paula in the US, and Suresh, Amit, and Priya in India.

Table 2

Study 2's Mixed Model Analysis

DV: condemnation				
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>
(constant)	5.06	.08	64.08	< .001
vignette				
plagiarism	-.33	.08	3.96	< .001
speeding	-1.09	.08	12.98	< .001
USA	.03	.06	.46	.645
time	-.02	.04	.41	.685
USA*time	.22	.04	5.03	< .001
DV: punishment				
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>
(constant)	5.03	.100	50.23	< .001
vignette				
plagiarism	-.94	.10	9.22	< .001
speeding	-1.07	.10	10.47	< .001
USA	-.20	.08	2.46	.014
time	.18	.04	4.24	< .001
USA*time	.17	.04	4.06	< .001

Note. *Plagiarism* and *speeding* are two dummy codes for the three vignettes, with the drug-se vignette as a reference group (see Table 1). *USA* is coded 1 for USA and -1 for India. *time* is coded -1 for baseline ratings and 1 for final ratings. Random effects parameters omitted.

Table 3

Contrast Analysis of the Condemnation Measure in Study 3

Comparison	Mean difference	95% CI	<i>d</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Misaligned preaching vs. average of remaining conditions					
US	0.50	[0.36 , 0.64]	1.36	48.37	0.0001
Japan	0.29	[0.13 , 0.44]	0.83	13.74	0.0002
Indonesia	0.22	[0.10 , 0.33]	0.61	13.02	0.0004
Misaligned preaching vs. no preaching					
US	1.07	[0.84 , 1.30]	2.17	71.95	0.0001
Japan	0.69	[0.43 , 0.95]	1.37	24.77	0.0001
Indonesia	0.34	[0.14 , 0.54]	0.66	11.20	0.0009
Misaligned preaching vs. non-misaligned preaching					
US	0.44	[0.17 , 0.70]	0.76	12.44	0.0005
Japan	0.17	[-0.09 , 0.43]	0.33	1.71	0.1961
Indonesia	0.31	[0.08 , 0.54]	0.53	8.55	0.0037

Note. *ds* and 95% CIs for each contrast were calculated based on pooled standard deviations of the specific cells tested by the contrast. Degrees of freedom for *F*-tests are (1, 348).

Table 4

Countries Represented in Study 4 and Number of Participants in Each, Sorted by Independence

Independence	Power distance	Tightness	Nation	<i>n</i>	Independence	Power distance	Tightness	Nation	<i>n</i>
12	81	3.7	Venezuela	1	46	49	.	Argentina	2
13	67	.	Colombia	4	46	54	8.6	Japan	7
14	78	.	Indonesia	1	48	77	11.0	India	25
16	64	.	Peru	4	51	57	5.4	Spain	6
18	60	10.0	S. Korea	3	54	13	3.1	Israel	5
20	80	7.9	China	7	55	11	6.8	Austria	1
20	74	10.4	Singapore	3	60	30	6.4	Iceland	1
20	64	.	Thailand	2	60	68	6.0	Poland	1
23	63	.	Chile	2	65	49	.	South Africa	3
25	68	6.3	Hong Kong	1	67	35	7.0*	Germany	11
25	92	1.6	Ukraine	1	68	34	.	Switzerland	2
25	90	.	UAE	1	70	28	.	Ireland	2
27	63	7.8	Portugal	3	71	68	6.3	France	7
30	81	7.2	Mexico	1	71	31	.	Sweden	2
30	80	.	Nigeria	3	74	18	.	Denmark	3
30	90	.	Romania	2	75	65	5.6	Belgium	4
32	94	.	Philippines	1	76	50	6.8	Italy	8
35	60	3.9	Greece	1	80	39	.	Canada	8
37	66	9.2	Turkey	3	80	46	2.9	Hungary	1
38	69	3.5	Brazil	14	80	38	3.3	Netherlands	1
39	45	.	Jamaica	1	89	35	6.9	UK	26
39	93	.	Russia	3	90	36	4.4	Australia	9
40	75	.	Lebanon	3	91	40	5.1	USA	28

Note. Higher (vs. lower) numbers indicate greater independence (vs. interdependence), power distance, or tightness (vs. looseness).

* We averaged the scores for former East and former West Germany from the Gelfand et al. (2011) data.

Table 5

Correlation Matrix for Study 4


Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1) BI					
2) Independence	-0.04				
3) Power Distance	0.07	-0.72 **			
4) Tightness	-0.01	-0.33 **	0.47 **		
5) Trust	0.52 **	0.14 *	-0.08	-0.02	
6) Commitment	0.22 **	-0.17 *	0.11	0.04	0.17 *

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. Due to missing data, $N = 155$ for the commitment/tightness correlation, $N = 178$ for all other correlations with tightness, $N = 197$ for all other correlations with commitment, and $N = 228$ for all remaining correlations.

Figures

Figure 1

Moral Condemnation (top panel) and Punishment (bottom panel) in Study 1 (M ± SE)




Note. Full range of variables on y-axes: 1-7. *Ms* and *SEs* derived from mixed model.

Figure 2

Mediation Diagram for Study 2

Culture affected condemnation for word-deed misalignment indirectly through how participants explained the misalignment




Note. Analyses controlled for baseline condemnation of the relevant misdeed, measured before participants learned about the preaching. Coefficients are unstandardized. Values in brackets are the indirect effect's 95% CI. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure 3

Condemnation Measure's Means ± SE in Study 3

A larger effect of misalignment in the US than in Japan or Indonesia




Note. Values in boxes, from top to bottom, are *M*, *SD*, and *n*. Each item on the condemnation scale was standardized separately in each culture before averaging. Thus, within-country comparisons are more informative than between-country comparisons.

Figure 4

Interaction Between BI and Culture on Trust in Study 4:

The relationship between BI and trust was stronger in independent countries than in interdependent countries.



Note. The figure plots regression predictions at the highest and lowest independence scores in our sample. The line labeled “independent” corresponds to the USA’s independence score (91) and the line for “interdependent” corresponds to Venezuela’s independence score (12).

**Appendix:
Study 3's Vignette**

Brackets indicate text that varied among conditions. The target person's name was Mr. Smith in the US, Mr. Suzuki in Japan, and Mr. Bang Bang in Indonesia – common names in each country.

Mr. Smith is a 37-year-old man. He works for a non-profit organization whose goal is to improve the wellbeing of people across the country. Mr. Smith puts together campaigns on various issues that are relevant to the non-profit's mission. Recently, his boss asked him to work on an anti-smoking [*a safe-driving*] [*a publicity*] campaign, and Mr. Smith agreed.

Mr. Smith takes his job very seriously. Thus, for the last year, he's been putting together anti-smoking advertisements [*safe driving advertisements*] [*advertisements for the organization*], going to high schools to teach students about the dangers of smoking [*about the dangers of reckless driving*] [*about the organization*], and lobbying the government to increase penalties for smoking in public places [*lobbying the government to increase penalties for moving violations*] [*lobbying grant-funding agencies to give money to his organization*].

Misaligned-preaching and non-misaligned preaching conditions only: When he is on the job, if he encounters individuals who smoke cigarettes [*who say they speed regularly*], Mr. Smith reprimands them, even if they only smoke socially or if they are already trying to quit [*even if they only go a few miles per hour over the speed limit*]. Mr. Smith reminds these people of how smoking and second-hand smoke [*driving too fast*] could cause them or others serious harm. Mr. Smith also believes that it is important for him and his colleagues to set an example when they travel for work, and once reprimanded a co-worker for smoking on her break [*for not obeying traffic rules*].

All conditions: Recently, while on vacation, Mr. Smith was by himself when he was ticketed for smoking a cigarette in a public place where smoking was prohibited [*Mr. Smith was by himself, running late to meet his closest friends at dinner, when he was pulled over for driving nearly thirty miles over the speed limit*].