Aminadav, G and Papaioannou, E (2020) Corporate Control around the World. Journal of Finance, 75 (3). pp. 1191-1246. ISSN 0022-1082
Abstract
We study corporate control tracing controlling shareholders for thousands of listed firms from 127 countries over 2004-2012. Government and family control is pervasive in civil-law countries. Blocks are commonplace, but less so in common-law countries. These patterns apply to large, medium, and small firms. In contrast, the development - control nexus is heterogeneous; strong for large but absent for small firms. Control correlates strongly with shareholder protection, the stringency of employment contracts and unions power. Conversely, the correlations with creditor rights, legal formalism, and entry regulation appear weak. These patterns support both legal origin and political theories of financial development.
More Details
Item Type: | Article |
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Subject Areas: | Economics |
Additional Information: |
© 2020 American Finance Association This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: 'Corporate Control around the World', by G Aminadav and E Papaioannou, The Journal of Finance 2020, Vol 75, Issue 3, pp 1191-1246, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12889. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. |
Date Deposited: | 08 Jan 2020 10:05 |
Date of first compliant deposit: | 07 Jan 2020 |
Subjects: |
Regulations Investment law |
Last Modified: | 21 Nov 2024 02:57 |
URI: | https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/1328 |