When it pays to be kind: the allocation of indirect reciprocity within power hierarchies

Inesi, M E, Adams, G S and Gupta, A (2021) When it pays to be kind: the allocation of indirect reciprocity within power hierarchies. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 165. pp. 115-126. ISSN 0749-5978

DOI: j.obhdp.2021.04.005

Abstract

Indirect reciprocity – the notion that third-party observers offer rewards to prosocial actors – is known to increase levels of cooperative behavior. Yet we know relatively little about how people decide to grant indirect reciprocity. This process is complex because it relies on assessing moral character, which is unobservable. In the current research, we identify a salient cue in the social environment that observers use to calibrate their indirect reciprocity: power differences. Across three experiments, observers were less likely to offer indirect reciprocity to employees who targeted their generosity toward higher- rather than lower-power co-workers. Indirect reciprocity was measured through the allocation of participants’ own financial resources (Experiments 1 and 2), as well as behavioral intentions (Experiment 3). Experiment 3 also showed that this effect is driven by observers’ perceptions of actors’ motives, which inform assessments of moral character.

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Item Type: Article
Subject Areas: Organisational Behaviour
Additional Information:

© 2021 Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-NC licence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4/0

Date Deposited: 19 May 2021 14:39
Date of first compliant deposit: 13 May 2021
Subjects: O > Organisational behaviour
S > Social roles
Last Modified: 15 Jun 2021 17:53
URI: https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/1780
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